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WHY A DIFFERENT APPROACH Is REQUIRED IF
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IS TO BE CONTROLLED
EFFICIENTLY OR EVEN AT ALL
ALAN CARLIN*
Proponents of greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions reductions have
long assumed that such reductions alone are the only, or at least the
best, approach to global climate change control. This Article argues that
there are a number of major uncertainties that any approach to climate
change control needs to take into account, but that some very important
conclusions can nevertheless be reached about the usefulness of reducing
GHG emissions for the purpose of controlling climate change in spite of
these uncertainties and without ignoring them. This Article first outlines
an extensive list of problems involved in attempting to use emissions re-
ductions to solve climate change problems. Then it explores the need for
new, more understandable, and effective goals for climate change control.
Finally, it outlines an alternative approach to climate change control that
appears to solve many of the problems of attempting to use emissions re-
ductions, including the many critical uncertainties, while more effectively
and efficiently achieving two of the goals of such reductions.
This Article finds that the emissions reduction approach would be
ineffective at solving the dangerous climate change effects of global warm-
ing because it would be technically risky, inflexible, extremely expensive,
and politically unrealistic, and would probably delay more effective and
vastly less expensive measures using solar radiation management. This
suggests the awful possibility that very large amounts of money may be
spent in a fruitless attempt to reduce GHG emissions at the same time
that all the possible adverse economic consequences of climate change
are realized.
* Senior Economist, United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), Washington,
D.C., USA. The author is indebted to Dr. John Davidson of the EPA for comments on
earlier drafts as well as for suggesting useful research publications. The views expressed
are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect those of the EPA or the U.S.
Government. This Article was presented at the William & Mary Environmental Law and
Policy Review Symposium entitled Emission Not Accomplished: The Future of Carbon
Emissions in a Changing World on February 2, 2008 and revised for publication in the
Environmental Law and Policy Review. Address correspondence to carlin.alan@epa.gov.
685
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL"Y REV.
In attempting to control climate change, the world is faced with
potentially catastrophic losses but also with very large uncertainties.
Wisdom would be to build a flexible control system that can handle all sig-
nificant risks inexpensively and with a high probability of success. Solar
radiation management either alone or with GHG emissions reductions
justifiable on other grounds, offers the best and probably only realistic
alternative for controlling global temperatures and avoiding dangerous
climate changes. Solar radiation management requires some development
to optimize operational details, comparatively modest funding, a reliable
command and control system, and a legal change-all of which has not
started. Both GHG emissions reductions and solar radiation management
need to be implemented with great caution given the risk of unintended
consequences in both approaches. This is unlikely to happen if action is
delayed until a future possible emergency occurs as a result of possible
climate change. Controlling sea level rise would appear to be a more useful
objective than GHG emissions control or carbon dioxide levels but needs
research. Solar radiation management would not solve the potential ocean
acidification problem, which needs additional research and probably future
action once the problem and solutions to it are better understood.
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INTRODUCTION
A. Definitions
It is important to start by defining two unusual terms that I have
created for this Article or are not widely understood. The first is exclu-
sive regulatory de-carbonization ("ERD"). ERD is defined as a strategy
for decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases ("GHGs") as the exclusive
approach used to control global warming. Most current climate change
control proposals involve some form of ERD such as regulations, emission
taxes, fuel economy, bio-fuel standards, and "cap and trade" proposals.
ERD assumes that if we could just reduce carbon emissions that humans
are putting into the environment, the global warming ("GW') problem
would be solved. I have termed such attempts ERD because most, but not
all, involve decreasing various forms of carbon emissions. If accomplished,
such decreases would reduce the levels of GHGs that would otherwise
accumulate in the atmosphere.' ERD is intended to include governmental
actions that are coordinated between nations (such as under the Kyoto
Protocol) or done independently by each country, state or other political
jurisdiction.
The second term is solar radiation management ("SRM"). SRM is
human-directed management of the amount and characteristics of incom-
ing solar radiation to part or all of the Earth. It is one type of atmospheric
geoengineering.
B. Principal Effects of Climate Change
Fundamental to a rational decision as to what to do about global
climate change is what the problems are that need to be solved, what and
how much needs to be done, and how soon to solve the problems. It is
sometimes forgotten that the objective of global climate change control
should not be to reduce emissions of GHGs, but rather to reduce specified
risks resulting from climate change. Previous research has shown that
the very widely proposed approach of reducing emissions of GHGs is not
likely to be either effective or efficient in reducing the risk of dangerous
climate changes or accomplishing some of the other goals of climate change
1 This would lower the top line representing GHG emissions in Figure 1(a). Figure 1(a)
shows the levels of various climate forcings over time since 1880. Infra Figure 1(a).
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control.' The three principal direct effects would appear to be the following
based on current knowledge:3
(E 1) Increasing risk of abrupt, non-linear climate changes/tipping
points. These are dangerous, self-reinforcing climate changes, and would
appear to be the most critical risk since they could cause a regional or
global disaster.4
(E2) Gradual increases (or possibly even decreases) in global tem-
peratures and their effects on humans and ecosystems is the best known
risk. Some people (those living in cold climates) might welcome gradually
increasing temperatures. Others (those living in very warm climates) prob-
ably would not. Almost everyone would face some adaptation expenses.
(E3) Non-temperature effects of climate change such as increasing
atmospheric GHG levels, especially the effects of increasing carbon dioxide
(C02) levels on the oceans. The resulting acidification is believed to already
be affecting shellfish and coral reefs. This may be the most difficult problem
to solve.'
Although most public discussion has addressed E2, the technical dis-
cussion has rightly centered on E1 as the basis for setting de-carbonization
goals, since the feared environmental changes could well be catastrophic
and possibly irreversible.
C. Underlying Theme-Climate Change Science is at Best
Uncertain
Perhaps because of the seeming unanimity of the reports from the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC"), one of the most
important, but often overlooked, aspects of climate change is the very
large scientific uncertainties involved. Uncertainties create risks. And
these risks can be catastrophic in nature if they substantially endanger
the welfare of a large enough number of people or ecosystems. In deciding
how to respond to the problems posed by climate change, it is very impor-
tant to select an approach that will take into account these risks and
2 Alan Carlin, Global Climate Change Control: Is There a Better Strategy than Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1401 (2007), available at httpJ/pennumbra
.con/issues/pdfs/155-6/Carlin.pdf [hereinafter Carlin, Global Climate Change Control].
a Id. at 1409-10. In my previous article I posited four direct effects of global warming.
4 See infra Section I.A.3 for a discussion, examples, and references to these potential
dangerous climate changes; see also id. at 1420-24.
'See infra Section II.B.3; see also Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2,
at 1472-76.
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provide an effective means to avoid them if they appear credible, signifi-
cant, or threatening.
The major reason for these uncertainties is the sheer complexity
of the Earth's climate system and the difficulty of determining what the
effect of changes to it might be. The following states the problem very well:
For more than 100 years, climate scientists have
fully understood that if all else were held constant, an in-
crease in the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide
(WO2) would lead to an increase in the near-surface air
temperatures. The problem becomes a lot more complicated
in the real world when we consider that "all else" cannot be
held constant and there are a lot more changes occurring
at any one time than just the concentration of CO2. Once the
temperature of the Earth starts inching upward, changes
immediately occur to atmospheric moisture levels, cloud
patterns, surface properties, and on and on. Some of these
changes, like the additional moisture, amplify the warming
and represent positive feedback mechanisms. Other conse-
quences, like the development of more low clouds, would act
to retard or even reverse the warming and represent nega-
tive feedbacks. Getting all the feedbacks correct is critical
to predicting future conditions, and these feedbacks are
simulated numerically in global climate general circulation
models (GCMs). Herein lies a central component of the
great debate-some GCMs predict relatively little warm-
ing for a doubling of CO2, and others predict substantial
warming for the same change in atmospheric composition.
If that is not enough, changes in CO 2 in the real
world would almost certainly be associated with other
changes in the atmosphere-sulfur dioxide, mineral aero-
sols (dust), ozone, black carbon, and who knows what else
would vary through time and complicate the "all else held
constant" picture. By the way, the Sun varies its output as
well. And when discussing climate change over the next
century, even more uncertainties come from estimations of
economic growth, adoption of various energy alternatives,
human population growth, land use changes, and.., you
get the message.6
6 World Climate Report, Global Warming: Not So Fast (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www
.worldclimatereport.com/index.php/2008/02/21/global-warming-not-so-fast/.
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Some important uncertainties are also created by the fact that
the Earth is not believed to have experienced the temperatures now pre-
dicted for this century in approximately thirty-five million years; therefore,
humans have no real experience with what all the effects of such temper-
ature increases might be.7 Recent research on sea level rise during the
previous interglacial period, approximately 120,000 years ago, found that
sea levels rose as rapidly as 1.6 meters per century and reached a level
about four to six meters higher than present. At this time global tempera-
tures were about 2°C above current levels under what is believed to be
much weaker climate forcing than at present. Whether this would be the
case under current circumstances is uncertain, but it is plausible that the
climate forcing could be higher now. Beyond a 2°C increase, however,
there is little guidance as to what might happen. One possible scenario,
for example, is that such temperatures, magnified as they are expected
to be in polar areas, would lead to the melting of much of the permafrost
in the Arctic.' There is concern that this could lead to the release of twice
as much GHGs as humans have released so far;1 ° which, in turn, could
lead to a runaway greenhouse effect and still higher temperatures.
Another major source of uncertainty is created by questions con-
cerning the relative significance of GHG levels in explaining climate
changes and the possibility of variations in basic physical measurements
(such as temperatures) outside of those experienced in recent decades and
inconsistent with the current GHG hypothesis of global warming. Al-
though the IPCC claims near unanimity for its conclusions," there remain
a significant number of skeptics who do not agree. 2 Even one prominent
' See Eminent Scientists Warn of Disastrous Permanent Global Warming, ENV'T NEWS
SERVICE (Feb. 19, 2007) (noting that current temperatures "rival those of the Eocene
epoch"); Daniel P. Schrag, Confronting the Climate-Energy Challenge, Presentation spon-
sored by the American Meteorological Association (Jan. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Schrag
Presentation], available at http'//www.ametsoc.org/atmospolicy/documents/SchragAMS
12182007.pdf(noting that the Eocene epoch was the last time Earth's atmospheric carbon
dioxide was above 500 ppm).
8 E.J. Rohling et al., High Rates of Sea-Level Rise During the Last Interglacial Period,
1 NATURE GEoSCI. 38,38 (2008), available at http://www.nature.comlngeo/journal/vlnl/
full/ngeo.2007.28.html.
9 Sergey A. Zimov et al., Permafrost and the Global Climate Budget, 312 SCIENCE 1612,
1612 (2006).
10 Schrag Presentation, supra note 7.
1' See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Reports, http://www.ipcc.ch/
ipccreports/index.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
12 See, e.g., News Release, Heartland Institute, New York Global Warming Conference
Considers 'Manhattan Declaration' (Mar. 4,2008), available at http'//www.heartland.org/
Article.cfm?artId=22866.
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non-skeptic appears to agree.13 The climate system is extremely compli-
cated and the GHG hypothesis together with other recognized influences
("climate forcings") on climate do not fully explain all of the available
historical climate observations even for the current Holocene Epoch. 4
The IPCC is basically using computer models to predict future climate and
temperatures. These models are only as good as the relationships they
assume and the data that they use.
The most prominent alternative to the GHG explanation for GW
during the Holocene primarily attributes much more significance to solar
variability. 5 Advocates argue that changes in the sun's eruptional activ-
ity, solar wind, and magnetic field, among other characteristics, have
been major determinants of global temperature here on Earth. 6 Since this
has not been taken into account in the IPCC models to date, these models
may need to be changed if they are to more accurately reflect reality.'7
13 Stephen Schneider, Edge: Modeling the Future -A Talk with Stephen Schneider (Apr. 1,
2007), available at httpJ/www.edge.org/3rd_culture/schneider08/schneider08_index.html
("Warming is unequivocal, that's true. But that's not a sophisticated question. A much
more sophisticated question is how much of the climate Ma Earth, a perverse lady, gives
us is from her, and how much is caused by us. That's a much more sophisticated, and
much more difficult question.").
14 HENRIK SVENSMARK & NIGEL CALDER, THE CHILLING STARS: A NEW THEORY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE (2007).
" Id. For a general history of research in this area, see Spencer Weart, Changing Sun,
Changing Climate? The Discovery of Global Warming (Aug. 2007), http'//www.aip.org/
history/climate/solar.htm. For recent particularly relevant research, see Nicole Scafetta
& Bruce Wood, Is Climate Sensitive to Solar Variability?, PHYSICS TODAY, Mar. 2008, at
50-51; see also Theodore Landscheidt, New Little Ice Age Instead of Warming 14 ENERGY
& ENV'T 327 (2003); Richard Mackey, Rhodes Fairbridge and the Idea that the Solar
System Regulates the Earth's Climate, 50 J. OF COASTAL RES. 955 (2007); I. Charatoya,
Can Origin of the 2400-Year Cycle of Solar Activity Be Caused by Solar Inertial Motion?,
18 ANNALES GEOPHYSIcAE 399-405 (2000). For a summary of recent developments in the
Svensmark discussion, see Jacopo Pasotti, Geophysics: Daggers Are Drawn Over Revived
Cosmic Ray-Climate Link, 319 SCIENCE 144 (2008); see also Vincent Courtillot et al., Are
There Connections Between the Earth's Magnetic Field and Climate, 253 EARTH &
PLANETARY ScI. LETTERS 329-39 (2007). These findings are at considerable variance with
the IPCC discussion of the contribution of solar variability to climate. See P. Forster et
al., Changes in Atmospheric Constituents and in Radiative Forcing, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 188-93 (S.
Solomon et al. eds., 2007).
6 Forster et al., supra note 15, at 188-93; see also Henrik Svensmark et al., Experimental
Evidence for the Role of Ions in Particle Nucleation under Atmospheric Conditions, 463
PROC. ROYAL Soc'Y 385 (2007).
" This assumes that solar variability should prove to have a significant influence on climate.
[Vol. 32:685692
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Unfortunately, despite every effort to consciously avoid doing so, it is all
too easy to develop models that explain historical data by "fitting the data";
it is much harder to accurately predict future events using such models.
So the ultimate test of the significance of GHGs in climate change may
not come as a result of new scientific inquiries using current knowledge,
but rather from experience over coming years and comparisons of this
experience with the predictions that have been made. If global tempera-
tures should decline further despite continuing increases in GHG levels,
as some skeptics and experts have predicted, advocates of the GHG expla-
nation for GW may have a difficult time explaining the new data in terms
of their hypothesis."8 If, on the other hand, temperatures start increasing
rapidly at the same time that solar activity decreases, the skeptics may
have a difficult time explaining how that could be. In 2007 the IPCC con-
cluded that they were at least ninety percent certain that human emis-
sions of GHGs rather than natural climate variations were warming the
planet. 9 That leaves up to a ten percent risk, according to the IPCC, that
this conclusion might be erroneous. Some observers have pointed out that
the solar magnetic field has been unusually low since a sudden drop in late
2005 and that the next solar cycle, sunspot cycle 24, appears to be late
starting and that this may presage a colder period for global tempera-
tures.2 ° If the increase in temperatures is not largely due to higher GHG
" Three of the four principal indices of global temperatures recorded their highest tem-
peratures in recent years in 1998, so can be said to have been declining since then. Anthony
Watts, 4 Sources Say "Globally Cooler" in the Past 12 Months, Watts Up with That? (Feb.
19,2008), http'//wattsupwiththat.wordpress.com/200802/19/january-2008-4-sources-say-
globally-cooler-in-the-past-12-months [hereinafter Watts, 4 Sources Sayl. Recently there
actually have been some early indications that something like this might be happening. As
usual, it is very hard to distinguish random climate events from a new trend. But all four
of the indices show surprisingly large drops between January 2007 and January 2008,
which may or may note be a precursor of further declines. This 2007-2008 decline brings
global temperatures back to about what they were in 1930, depending on which index is
used. Id.
19 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYsICAL
SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 8 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/dr4/wgl-spm.pdf. "Most of the observed increase in globally averaged
temperatures since the mid- [twentieth] century is very likely due to the observed increase
in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations." Id. at 3 n.6 (defining "very likely" as
a greater than ninety percent probability of occurrence).
20 Anthony Watts, Where Have All the Sunspots Gone?, Watts Up with That? (Feb. 13,
2008), http://wattsupwiththat.wordpress.com/2008/02/13/where-have-all-the-sunspots-
gone. It is interesting, but hardly conclusive, to compare the four temperature charts refer-
enced in Watts, 4 Sources Say, supra note 18, with the observed geomagnetic averaged
planetary index referenced in this footnote, particularly the sharp drop in late 2005.
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levels, as currently hypothesized by the IPCC, reducing GHG emissions
may have less effect than the advocates of GHG emission controls now
believe.2 All this is not to argue that the GHG explanation of current
global warming is wrong--only that the climate system may be more com-
plicated than our current understanding of it and that there exists more
uncertainty than is often acknowledged. The important thing is to take
these uncertainties into account in proposing an effective and efficient
control approach rather than ignoring them and making guesses as to
what assumptions to make as to climate sensitivity to increased GHG
levels or adopting a single hypothesis that discounts the substantial evi-
dence of the impact of solar variability on Earth's climate.
A third major source of uncertainty is created by the very large
adverse effects that may result if abrupt non-linear climate changes (El)
should occur. Since the magnitude, timing, and probability of these effects
are themselves very uncertain, this is still another important uncertainty
that needs to be taken into account when control measures and the analy-
sis of them are considered.22
Anthony Watts, A Look at Temperature Anomalies for All 4 Global Metrics: Section I, Watts
Up With That? (Feb. 27, 2008), http://wattsupwiththat.wordpress.com/2008/02/27/a-loo-
at-temperature-anomalies-for-all-4-global-matrics. The question ofthe relative influence
of solar versus GHG changes is further compounded by research published in 2007 which
concludes that:
There is considerable evidence for solar influence on the Earth's pre-
industrial climate and the Sun may well have been a factor in post-
industrial climate change in the first half of the last century. Here we
show that over the past 20 years, all the trends in the Sun that could
have had an influence on the Earth's climate have been in the opposite
direction to that required to explain the observed rise in global mean
temperatures.
Mike Lockwood & Claus Frohlich, Recent Oppositely Directed Trends in Solar Climate
Forcings and the Global Mean Surface Air Temperature, 463 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y 2447,
2447 (2007). For a contrary view, see HENRIK SVENSMARK & EIGL FRIIs-CHRISTENSEN,
DANISH NAT'L SPACE CTR., REPLY TO LOCKWOOD AND FROHLICH-THE PERSISTENT ROLE
OF THE SUN IN CLIMATE FORCING (2007), available at http'//www.spacecenter.dk/publications/
scientific-report-series/ScientNo._3.pdf.
21 Scafetta & Wood, supra note 15, at 50 (concluding that the Sun "could account for as
much as 69% of the increase in Earth's average temperature," contrary to the conclusions
of the IPCC, and "[flurthermore, if the Sun does cool off, as some solar physicists predict
will happen over the next few decades, that cooling could stabilize Earth's climate and
avoid catastrophic consequences predicted in the IPCC report").
22 Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic
Climate Change, REv. ECON. & STAT. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript 1-2), available at
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/weitzman/filestmodeling.pdf.
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One of the more unfortunate aspects of the large uncertainties
involved in trying to predict future climate is that there has been a ten-
dency for the. IPCC to underestimate the actual temperature increases
and related effects in the Arctic that have recently been observed.2' This
is presumably not because they wanted to, but may rather be because the
process of gaining a consensus and the use of models based on previous
experience naturally reduces the estimates of extreme values which may
be proposed, particularly at temperatures outside the realm of previous
measurements. The requirement for consensus presumably in this case
favored the use of more "conservative" (i.e., nearer recent experience), more
easily documented assumptions. These risks appear to be credible pos-
sibilities; what is unknown is how important they will turn out to be as
humans continue with the experiment of putting large quantities of GHGs
into the atmosphere.
Given these major uncertainties, it would be very easy to conclude
that very little could reasonably be said about how best to control global
warming. This Article, however, argues that some very important conclu-
sions can nevertheless be reached about the usefulness of reducing GHG
emissions for the purpose of controlling climate change in spite of these
uncertainties and without assuming them away. It will do so by first outlin-
ing the major problems involved in attempting to use the widely proposed
ERD to solve climate change problems (Section I). Then it will outline the
need for new, more understandable, and effective goals for climate change
control (Section II). Next it will discuss an alternative approach to climate
change control that appears to solve many of the problems of attempting
to use ERD (Section III) while more effectively and efficiently achieving
the goals of ERD. Finally, it will offer some conclusions.
I. ERD WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE CLIMATE CHANGE
CONTROL GOALS
There are numerous problems with pursuing ERD as the approach
to control global climate change. This section will explain why such an
approach would be technically risky, inflexible, extremely expensive, and
politically unrealistic.
23 Stefan Rahmstorf et al., Recent Climate Observations Compared to Projections, 316
SCIENCE 709,709 (2007); see Daniel P. Schrag, Confronting the Climate-Energy Challenge,
3 ELEMENTS 171, 174 (2007) [hereinafter Schrag, Confronting] (stating that the Keeling
curve underestimates human impact on climate).
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A. Technically Risky
From a technical perspective ERD would have great difficulty in
achieving any specific climate change control goals expressed in terms of
the major effects. There are a number of reasons for this, which will be dis-
cussed in this section. The first is our inability to accurately determine
climate sensitivity24 and other effects of GHGs in advance. The second is
ERD's inability to avoid rapid polar and particularly Arctic warming and,
therefore, sea level rise should it continue. The third is that ERD is un-
likely to be able to prevent potential abrupt climate changes (Els). The
fourth is that ERD itself can have major adverse environmental effects.
Finally, the important uncertainties in predicting future climate changes
suggest that we may not know enough to justify large investments in ERD
for climate change control purposes, at least until they are much better
understood.
1. Inability to Accurately Determine Climate Sensitivity and
Hence Emissions Reductions Needed
It appears unlikely that the climate system will ever be understood
sufficiently well to determine the extent to which GHG emissions must
be controlled decades in advance using ERD or the benefits of doing so.
Climate sensitivity, the key technical variable describing climate temper-
ature sensitivity to increased GHG levels, appears to be unknowable in
advance.
In order to determine the extent of the emissions reductions which
ERD advocates propose, it is necessary to make a large number of assump-
tions as to important physical relationships for which we do not have and,
in some cases, may never have proven relationships. One of the most im-
portant of these parameters is the relationship between a doubling of CO 2
levels and global temperatures, the so-called climate sensitivity factor.25
But there are many others as well, ranging from the validity of current
atmospheric and glacial flow models to fundamental factors influencing
climate that we may not yet fully understand. Because the Earth's climate
system is very complex and scientific understanding of it is far from com-
plete, new information and significant refinements of existing knowledge
24 For a definition of climate sensitivity, see Roe & Baker, infra note 27 and accompanying
text.
25 Schrag, Confronting, supra note 23, at 172-74.
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have occurred in recent years, should be expected in the future, and are
likely to prove to be the rule rather than the exception. And as discussed in
introductory Section C above, current projections indicate that the Earth
is likely to experience higher temperatures than previously experienced
by humans with the result of humans having very little knowledge of what
may happen as a result. The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change ("UNFCCC") process has drawn on many eminent experts
through the iterative IPCC process, perhaps to try to minimize this prob-
lem.26 It is already evident, however, that this process so far has tended
to fairly consistently underestimate the seriousness of the problem with
regard to the Arctic compared to recent observations. Subsection 2 below
documents a number of important polar areas where there appear to have
been such underestimates. But more generally, another problem posed
by the IPCC process is that such attempts to create scientific consensus
on a subject are basically antithetical to the nature of science. Science
advances through a process of creative destruction, not consensus building.
Put another way, unless new ideas are allowed to be proposed and tested,
science will not advance. And it would be hard to find an area which has a
greater need to advance than climate science given the large uncertainties
and its inherent chaotic nature.
The most fundamental uncertainty is the climate sensitivity factor,
on which every estimate of required emissions reductions must be based.
A recent study explains why this crucial factor may never be known with
any accuracy in advance." The study makes a number of points, including
that little progress has been made in determining the climate sensitivity
factor, that the conclusion results from the basic nature of climate, that
there are fat "tails" of possible extreme outcomes, and that if extreme
events are set in motion, the outcome is difficult to predict from today's
data.2" The study concludes that we must, therefore, concentrate on tem-
perature (or possibly related) targets, not unknowable emissions targets.29
Obviously, if it is not possible to know climate sensitivity fairly accu-
rately in advance, it is not possible to accurately determine the atmospheric
GHG levels required to avoid breaching a specified global temperature
2 6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfcc.int/2860.php
(last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
27 Gerard S. Roe & Marcia B. Baker, Why is Climate Sensitivity So Unpredictable?, 318
SCIENCE 629, 629 (2007).28 /d.
2Id. at 632.
20081
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
level. And if no required atmospheric GHG level can be accurately de-
termined, there is little basis for determining the required emissions re-
ductions to achieve that level. An overestimation of the GHG emission
reduction levels required would result in extremely expensive over-control
which would achieve no real purpose.3' An underestimation of emission
reductions required would mean that the objectives would not be achieved,
with whatever adverse effects in which this might result.
Without an accurate knowledge of the climate sensitivity factor in
advance, ERD is based on nothing more than an informed guess. Do we
really want to gamble the climate future of the world on informed guesses?
I do not think so.
2. Inability to Avoid Threatened Rapid Arctic Warming and,
Therefore, Sea Level Rise
In the last few years there have been a number of disturbing cli-
mate changes, particularly in the polar areas, that suggest that the polar
warming problem may be more serious than the picture painted by the
IPCC, and even by some proponents of emissions reductions. This section
will summarize some of the most significant changes in order to illustrate
that there are substantial uncertainties in our understanding of Earth's
climate system and the inability of ERD to prevent such changes. This
is not intended to say that such disturbing changes will continue in the
future, since I argue that we do not know enough to say. It does illustrate,
however, the difficulties of trying to guess far in advance what will happen
to Earth's climate and therefore what may need to be done to control such
changes.
Arctic temperatures have been increasing rapidly since the early
1990s while the mass of the Greenland Ice Sheet ("GIS") and the extent of
Arctic Sea ice have been decreasing rapidly in the last few years.3' 2007
represented a dramatic year in this regard in that both the GIS and Arctic
3' For what it may be worth, one recent comprehensive study based on Antarctic ice cores
covering the last 42,000 years suggests that the climate sensitivity factor was between
1.3 to 2.3°C compared to the IPCC's range of 2.0 to 4.5°C. See Petr Chylek & Ulrike
Lohmann, Aerosol Radiative Forcing and Climate Sensitivity Deduced from the Last
Glacial Maximum to Holocene Transition, 35 GEoPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L04804 (2008).
If their estimates should hold going forward, this would mean that temperature changes
due to increases in CO2 levels would be much lower than the IPCC predicts.
31 Rune G. Graversen et al., Vertical Structuring of Recent Arctic Warming, 451 NATURE
53, 53 (2008).
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Sea ice have decreased by unexpectedly large amounts." Like other scien-
tific issues involving climate change, it is unclear how much of this is due
to global warming and how much to other causes.33 In any case, if this
Arctic warming is a trend rather than a short-term climatic variation,
ERD is not likely to be very useful in averting the serious effects that
such temperature increases in the Arctic may have on humans and eco-
systems. There is already speculation that a major"tipping point" has been
reached. 4 There are at least two reasons to worry that this could be the
case. The first is that the albedo of snow is much greater than that of
water. 5 As sea ice melts, it is replaced by open water, which absorbs most
of the sunlight hitting it. The result is a positive feedback in which the loss
of sea ice leads to additional ocean warming from absorbed sunlight.36 A
second possible feedback effect concerns the potential release of methane
from warming permafrost, which could potentially release more GHGs
than man has so far managed to do.3"
If Arctic warming continues at the current rapid rate, ERD is
not likely to be very useful in responding to this warming, given the time
required for a scientific consensus to be formed, suitable models built,
international political agreement reached, and GHG reductions actually
implemented. It appears unlikely that it would be possible to even deter-
mine what GHG reductions would be necessary to avoid undesirable Arctic
warming. Its rapidity was also not predicted by the IPCC or existing
models, which does not increase confidence in the idea that future use of
ERD could reasonably be based on such a scientific consensus far enough
in advance of the event to make it useful. If these changes are the result of
current atmospheric GHG levels, preventing future Arctic warming using
ERD could require the actual removal of GHGs already in the atmosphere
rather than the comparatively far easier task of decreasing future GHG
emissions into the atmosphere.
32 Mark Serezze, Arctic Sea Ice Melt, Presentation at a Seminar Sponsored by the American
Meteorological Association (Nov. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Serezze Presentation], available
at http://www.ametsoc.orglatmospolicy/documents/ams-serrezebriefing.pdf.
33 Graversen et al., supra note 31, at 55.
' There is considerable difference of opinion on this subject. See, e.g., Keith Sherwood &
Craig Idso, Declining Arctic Sea Ice: Has a "Tipping Point" Been Passed? 10 CO2 Sci.
(2007), http://www.co2science.org/articles/V10/N40/EDIT.jsp.
" Polar Albedo-the Earth's White Caps Help Keep the Climate in Balance, Sci. POLES,
Jan. 31,2006, http://www.sciencepoles.orgindex.php?/articles/polar_albedotheearths
_white_capshelp-keep-theclimate balance&s=2&rs=home&uid=625&lg=en&category=3.36 
Id.
7 Fred Pearce, Climate Warming as Siberia Melts, NEW SCI. Aug. 11, 2005, at 12, available
at http://environment.newscientist.com/article/mg18725124.500.html.
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This section will discuss five such disturbing polar climate and
related changes: (a) changes in Arctic Sea ice, (b) Greenland Ice Sheet
mass losses, (c) collapse of polar ice shelves, (d) West Antarctic Ice Sheet
losses, and (e) sea level rise.
a. Arctic Sea Ice Decreases
Arctic Sea ice reached the lowest extent ever recorded at the end
of the Arctic summer in September 2007,3" and was younger and thin-
ner than in previous years.39 Even worse, the ice extent appears to have
dropped well below a long-term downward trend line going back as far as
1979 and appears to represent a sharp break with the latter part of the
twentieth century.' Sea ice coverage was about thirty-eight percent below
the long-term average for late summer, and twenty-three percent below
the previous recorded low two years previously.4' Arctic Sea temperatures
were 3.5°C warmer than average and 1.5*C warmer than the previous
recorded high.42 This warmer water greatly reduced the thickness of sea
ice in the summer of 2007-about five times the normal loss from this
cause.43 Furthermore, the sea ice extent appears to be significantly lower
than that predicted by even the most pessimistic of the IPCC models."
Given that these decreases have accelerated in very recent years it is diffi-
cult to see how ERD could act rapidly enough to prevent further decreases
of this magnitude and rapidity assuming that the current short-term
trend continues. The current decreases may or may not be the result of in-
creases in the current ambient levels of GHGs in the atmosphere. These
levels would not be decreased by ERD; the only effect of decreases in
GHG emissions might be to decrease the rate of increase in temperatures
and decrease the possible future loss of Arctic Sea ice compared to what
it might otherwise have been. If sea ice continues to decrease and if there
is a desire not to have that happen, there is no easy way to determine what
change in GHG emissions levels would be necessary. In fact, it appears
38 Serezze Presentation, supra note 32, at 2-3.
39 Id. at 12.40 Id. at 3.
41 Sid Perkins, Portrait of a Meltdown: Many Factors Led to 2007's Record Low in Arctic
Sea Ice, 172 Sci. NEWS 387, 387 (2007).
42
/d.
' Id. (quoting Donald Perovich of the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering
Laboratory in Hanover, NH).
4Serezze Presentation, supra note 32, at 7.
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likely that it might require an end to all new GHG emissions and the
actual removal of GHGs already in the atmosphere. Neither of these are
either practically feasible or likely currently. As previously noted, a very
disturbing result of the decreasing extent of Arctic Sea ice is that it greatly
decreases the surface albedo, which results in increased absorption of the
Sun's energy by the sea. Whether this is the reason for the much warmer
water temperatures is not known. This would be a positive feedback from
sea ice losses.
b. Greenland Ice Sheet Losing Mass
Temperatures in Greenland have increased rapidly since about
1990, although they were higher in the mid-20th century.45 Between the
1960s and 1990s, changes in the Greenland Ice Sheet ("GIS") appear to
have been due to regional rather than global changes.46 The past fifteen
years show a statistically significant link with global temperatures and
increased ice melting.4" Southern Greenland's climate is currently respon-
sive to general Northern Hemisphere warming and may be highly suscep-
tible to further such warming.4"
The GIS has experienced increasing melt areas since 1979 with
an upward trend line. In 2007 the area exceeded the previous maximum
during this period by ten percent.4 9 This also results in a positive adverse
feedback since areas either with meltwater on the surface or that have pre-
viously had meltwater on them have much lower albedo. ° Recent studies
of GIS mass have concluded that there is a substantial loss which may be
accelerating. Ice mass losses are about 238 cubic kilometers per year, or
about 0.5 mm per year in terms of sea level rise.5'
Head of NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Cryosphere Sciences
Branch Waleed Abdalati concludes that:
" Edward Hanna et al., Increased Runoff from Melt from the Greenland Ice Sheet: A
Response to Global Warming, 21 J. CLIMATE 331, 331-41 (2008).46 Id. at 338-39.
47 id.
48 Id. at 332.49Konrad Steffan, Greenland Ice Sheet: Dynamic Response to Global Warming, Presentation
at seminar sponsored by the American Meteorological Society, Slide 9 (Nov. 26, 2007),
available at http'//www.ametsoc.org/atmospolicy/documents/Gr%2AMS%20congressional
%20%20briefing.pdf.
o Polar Albedo, supra note 35.
51 Steffan, supra note 49, at 13 (citing Isabella Velicogna & John Wahl, Acceleration of
Greenland Ice mass Loss in Spring 2004, 443 NATuRE 329 (2006)).
20081 701
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
While differences in these studies still exist,... collectively,
they very convincingly paint a picture of the Greenland Ice
Sheet as having been close to balance in the 1990s, contrib-
uting a small amount to sea level, but becoming signifi-
cantly out of balance and losing a substantial amount of
ice to the sea in the last several years.52
It appears to be a credible possibility that the accelerating erosion
of the GIS may continue and that would contribute to a higher sea level;
which would adversely affect human infrastructure and would be very dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to reverse. But if ERD were used to avoid this pos-
sibility, it is difficult to see how GHG emissions reductions can be related
to future GIS losses if the objective were to stabilize the GIS, or that ERD
would have any immediate effect on the current acceleration even if a
reliable relationship could be established. The models used by the IPCC
ignore the possible disintegration of ice shelves and resulting speedup of
glaciers, so they are unable to predict any global sea level rise from this
source due to warming. 3 It is possible that such models can be built, but
in the meantime it would be difficult to determine what particular change
in GHG emissions would be needed to stabilize the GIS or how soon that
might occur using ERD. Hence if GIS stabilization were the objective,
selection of an emissions reduction objective would, at best, be an informed
guess.
c. Collapse of Polar Ice Shelves
In both the Arctic and the Antarctic Peninsula ice shelves which
are believed to have existed for many thousands of years have been col-
lapsing in recent years. The best known of these is the Larsen B Ice Shelf
on the Antarctic Peninsula, which collapsed in 2002 over a thirty-five day
period.' The collapse has been attributed to the buildup of melt water
ponds in late January, apparently in response to an unusually warm sum-
mer and extended melt season.5" Most of these ponds disappeared in
5 Kendall Haven, Greenland's Ice Island Alarm, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY, Aug. 28,
2007, http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Study/Greenland/greenland5.html.
' Anil Ananthaswamy, Peering Beneath Glacier Might Explain Speedier Slide, NEW SC.,
Feb. 4, 2008, at 12.
4 Larsen B Ice Shelf Collapses in Antarctica, NATL SNOW & ICE DATA CENTER, Mar. 18,
2002, http'//nsidc.orgiceshelves/larsenb2002/index.html.
" Douglas R. MacAyeal et al., Catastrophic Ice-shelf Break-up by an Ice-shelf-
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February, probably draining through fissures in the ice. 6 By late February
790 square kilometers of the shelf had disappeared.5 7 By early March al-
most another 2500 square kilometers had disappeared in the same area
where the melt water ponds were seen earlier.58 While the breakup of such
ice shelves themselves have little impact on sea level, they are believed
to have a major impact on the rate of ice flow off the land as a result of
the removal of the buttress blocking their access to the sea, and hence on
future sea level rise.59 New research, however, suggests that Larsen B had
been somewhat unstable prior to the collapse due to weak "suture zones"
between the contributions of various glaciers that fed it and ice shelf re-
treat from 1998 to 2000.60 That does not explain the reasons for the re-
treat, however, which appear to be related to warming temperatures in the
area. It is not at all clear exactly how much or how soon GHG emissions
would have to be reduced to prevent other possible ice shelf collapses in
Antarctica nor how this might be calculated.
d. West Antarctic Ice Sheet Losing Mass
Very recent research concludes that the West Antarctic Ice Sheet
("WAIS") is also losing significant mass, almost as much as the GIS.6'
West Antarctica is estimated to have lost 132±60 Gt/yr (147±67 cubic
kilometers/yr.) in 2006, with losses concentrated in far west Antarctica
in glaciers emptying into the Amundsen Sea.62 The loss on the Antarctic
Peninsula is estimated to be 60±46 Gt/yr (67±51 cubic kilometers/yr.) in
2006, and has been concentrated on the east side of the Peninsula. The
fragmentcapsize Mechanism, 49 J. GLACIOLOGY 22, 22 (2003); Ted Scambos et al.,
Climate-Induced Ice Shelf Disintegration in the Antarctic Peninsula, in ANTARCTIC
PENINSULA CLIMATE VARIABILITY: A HISTORICAL AND PALEOENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
79,80 (E.W. Domarck et al. eds., 2003); C.J. Van der Veen, Fracture Propagation as Means
of Rapidly Transferring Surface Meltwater to the Base of Glaciers, 34 GEOPHYSICS RES.
LETTERS L01501 (2007).
56 Larsen B Ice Shelf Collapses, supra note 54.
57 id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
6 N.F. Glasser & Ted A. Scambos, A Structural Glaciological Analysis of the 2002 Larsen
B Ice Shelf Collapse, 54 J. GLACIOLOGY 3, 14-15 (2008).
61 Eric Rignot et al., Recent Antarctic Ice Mass Loss from Radar Interferometry and
Regional Climate Modeling, 1 NATURE GEOSCI. 106, 106 (2008).
62 See Marc Kaufman, Escalating Ice Loss Found in Antarctica, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,
2007, at Al.
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total is 214±118 cubic kilometers/yr.13 In both cases this may be due to
glacial acceleration, which in turn may be a result of increased ocean tem-
peratures. As in the case of the GIS, attempts to use ERD to prevent a
further rise in sea levels from WAIS mass losses would have to based at
best on an informed guess.
e. Sea Level Rise
Sea level rise is one of the least controversial effects of global
warming and one of the better documented ones. It appears to primarily
result from several factors, particularly:
* Melting of the ice sheets in Greenland, West
Antarctica, and East Antarctica
* Melting of other glaciers not part of the three ice
sheets
* Thermal expansion of the oceans as they rise in
temperature.6
Given the location of much human infrastructure near sea level,
even a small increase in sea level would have some adverse effect. Even
a small increase in the risk to New Orleans or Venice is not a desirable
outcome. Increased damage is likely first from storms and ultimately from
permanent flooding of low-lying areas near oceans. When and if it occurs,
humans would either suffer increased storm damage to their infrastruc-
ture and the land on which it sits or have to build and maintain massive
engineering works to avoid storm flooding. If sea level should continue
to rise, the infrastructure and land would probably have to be abandoned
as it becomes permanently flooded. Reductions in the disappearance of
glaciers from temperate latitudes is likely to result in decreased runoff
during the warm months, which decreases the water available for irri-
gation during those months.
Two researchers have developed a graph showing the 2001 IPCC
projections of sea level rise and comparing these with actual global sea
level rise.65 It shows an increasing divergence between the two, with a
Rignot et al., supra note 61, at 106.
64 See A. Cazenave & R.S. Nerem, Present-day Sea Level Change: Observations and
Causes, 42 REv. GEoPHYsICs 20 (2004).
65 Id.
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divergence of more than a centimeter between the two trend lines in
recent years.66
There is no way to know whether sea level will continue increasing,
decrease, or stay the same. But in recent years it has increased at a fairly
steady rate according to current information.67 There would appear to be
a credible risk that it will continue to rise if glaciers and polar ice sheets
continue to respond to present or possible future warmer polar tempera-
tures and if the oceans continue to experience thermal expansion. Once an
ice sheet loses mass it is very difficult, and probably infeasible, to put it
back given the huge volumes of ice involved. It would appear to be more
efficient to prevent ice sheet mass losses than to attempt to protect valu-
able infrastructure near sea level in the future. Prudence and economics
would suggest early action to at least stabilize sea level. Obviously, if world
temperatures and sea level should stop rising, much less would need to
be done. But in an ideal world, lowering polar temperatures enough to
prevent damage to human infrastructure and resources would probably
be a much cheaper way to avoid flood damage than the construction and
maintenance of massive engineering works.
As shown in the table below, the previous interglacial period
roughly 120,000 years ago is believed to have had roughly a four meter
higher sea level and one to two degrees Celsius higher global tempera-
tures. The Pliocene Era, roughly three million years ago, is believed to
have had two to three degrees Celsius warmer temperatures and about
a twenty-five meter higher sea level. In contrast, in the Eocene Epoch,
approximately forty million years ago, sea level was about seventy-five
meters higher and temperatures about four degrees Celsius higher, while
twenty thousand years ago at the last glacial maximum temperatures
were about six degrees colder and sea level about 125 meters lower. All
these points form a relatively straight line on a chart, suggesting that the
IPCC projection of three degrees Celsius higher temperatures and less
than a one meter higher sea level by 2100 are inconsistently much lower
than the line.6" Now this could be because it takes time for sea level to
6 Id.
67 Id.
' David Archer & Victor Brovkin, Millennial Atmospheric Lifetime of Anthropogenic
CO2, Figure 3 (Dec. 6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with Climatic Change and
available at httpJ/www.pik-potsdam.de-victor/archer.subm.clim.change.pdf). The following
quotation from the same article suggests that real ice sheets might be able to collapse
more quickly than generally realized:
The forecast for the coming century is for only 0.5-1 meters, in spite of
a temperature change of X C .... The contrast with the data from the
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readjust to higher temperatures and that 100 years is too short a time for
that adjustment to take place, or it could be that the IPCC underestimated
the rise in sea level that might occur by 2100. In any case, it appears cred-
ible that sea level will continue to rise unless there is a significant change
in global temperatures. For the reasons discussed in Subsection b above,
it would be very difficult under an ERD approach to determine how much
of a change in emissions would be necessary to stop sea level rise by any
specific date.
Sea Level and Global Temperatures by Epoch 9
Interglacial periods max. Pliocene
(- 120kybp) (Hansen)
Global average Hansen (2007) +1 +2-3
temps compared to Rohling (2007) +2
present (C)
Sea level compared Hansen +4i-2 +25±10
to present (meters) Rohling +4-6
Max rate of sea Hansen +5
level rise Rohling 1.6
(meters/century)
3. Inability to Control Other Potentially Dangerous Climate
Changes
The long standing concern about E 1 is that there may be a "tipping
point" where a continued rise in global temperatures will trigger non-linear,
past is that it takes longer than a century to melt a major ice sheet,
according to the ice sheet models used to generate the sea level rise
forecast. There are reasons to believe that real ice sheets might be able
to collapse more quickly than our models are able to account for, as they
did during Meltwater Pulse 1A 19 kyr ago.., or during the Heinrich
events.., neither of which are well simulated by models. At any rate,
if we consider that warming from CO2 release persists for hundreds of
millennia, we have plenty of time to change sea level. The correlation
with the past seems to indicate that we could ultimately raise sea level
by 50 meters.
Id. at 5.
69 E.J. Rohling et al., High Rates of Sea-level Rise During the Last Interglacial Period, 1
NATURE GEoscI. 38, 38 (2008); James Hansen et al., Dangerous Human-made Interference
with Climate: A GISS Model E Study,7 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSIcS 2287, 2287
(2007) [hereinafter Hansen et al., Dangerous].
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self-reinforcing further warming or other dangerous environmental ef-
fects beyond those resulting immediately from the temperature rise itself.
Numerous scenarios have been proposed.7 ° Very recently Tim Lenton of
University of East Anglia and colleagues concluded the following after
eliciting fifty experts and researching many possibilities:
Society may be lulled into a false sense of security by
smooth projections of global change. Our synthesis of pres-
ent knowledge suggests that a variety of tipping elements
could reach their critical point within this century under
anthropogenic climate change. The greatest threats are
tipping the Arctic sea-ice and the Greenland ice sheet, and
at least five other elements could surprise us by exhibiting
a nearby tipping point.7 '
In early 2006 James Hansen of NASA stated, "I will argue that we are near
a tipping point, a point of no return, beyond which the built in momentum
and feedbacks will carry us to levels of climate change with staggering
consequences for humanity and all of the residents of this planet."
72
The inability of ERD to control some potential abrupt climate
changes (Els) is illustrated by two cases:
(a) Hansen et al.'s ice sheet disintegration hypothesis;73
(b) The European Union's ("EU") 2°C threshold.74
In (a) there is assumed to be a maximum level of 450 ppm CO 2 in the atmo-
sphere and one degree further increase (1.8°C above pre-industrial), 5
Hansen's characterization of the situation may have become more urgent
late in 2007, however, since he reportedly revised this maximum level to
350 ppm.76 Since the current atmospheric level of carbon dioxide is about
383 ppm, there is no way to reduce levels to 350 ppm this century even if
71 See Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1445-80.
71 Tim M. Lenton et al., Tipping Elements in the Earth's Climate System, PROC. NAT'L
AcAD. Sci. 1786, 1792 (2008).
72 James E. Hansen, Can We Still Avoid Dangerous Human-made Climate Change?
Presentation at New School University (Feb. 10, 2006) (transcript available at http://www
.columbia.edu-jehl/newschool textandslides.pdf).73 See generally Hansen et al., Dangerous, supra note 69.74 Council of the European Union, Climate Change: Medium and Longer Term Emission
Reduction Strategies, Including Targets-Council Conclusions (Mar. 11, 2005), http://
register.consilium.europa.eu/pdffen/05/st7/st07242.enO5.pdf.
7' Hansen et al., Dangerous, supra note 69, at 2306.
76Bill McKibben, Remember This: 350 Partsper Million, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2007, at A21.
2008] 707
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
all GHG emissions stopped today other than that of CO2, which is very
expensive to remove from the atmosphere directly.7 In reality, emissions
have been increasing at an increasing rate. In the EU's scenario (b) there
is assumed to be a substantial risk of El if global temperatures exceed two
degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.78 Case (b) is a little less strict
than (a) since Hansen's maximum further increase of global temperatures
of one degree Celsius would be roughly consistent with a 1.8°C increase
from pre-industrial levels. Each of these will be discussed in turn in this
subsection. These hypotheses are not presented as proven science but
rather as illustrations of abrupt climate changes (El) that humans may
want to nevertheless take measures to avoid because of their potentially
catastrophic results. Even if there may only be a small chance that they
would actually occur, it is reasonable to ask how an ERD approach would
handle these possibly "worst case" scenarios. Case (a) is somewhat similar
to the sea level rise and large scale flooding predicted by some proponents
of ERD, such as Al Gore. Case (a) is selected, in part, to represent such
predictions because it is more carefully defined and documented, which
makes it possible to analyze the feasibility of controlling it using ERD.
No case is made concerning the likelihood or reasonableness of case (a).
But if (a) is not likely to be controllable using ERD, the use of potential
sea level rise as an argument for using ERD would appear to be equally
weak. Case (a) is selected as a worst credible case-just the type of case
where climate change control would definitely be useful. ifERD could not
handle it, its usefulness can be questioned.
a. Hansen et al. Ice Sheet Disintegration Hypothesis
One of the threats, which I will call GIS/WAIS disintegration, has
been proposed by a prominent group of American climate scientists,
usually with James Hansen as the lead author. Two recent papers on the
subject by Hansen et al. both concern the risks from additional global
warming as a result of sea level rise due to disintegration of ice sheets in
Greenland and West Antarctica. The first paper argues that there are
dangerous risks if global temperatures rise more than one degree Celsius
above current levels.79 The second uses data from the last 400,000 years
of Earth's history to predict how and why they believe that sea levels
7 7
1d.
78 Council of the European Union, supra note 74.
7' Hansen et al., Dangerous, supra note 69, at 2306.
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may rise significantly over this century and to quantify key parameters,
including much higher climate sensitivity to increased CO2evels.80 A third
paper summarizes other research showing that the Greenland and West
Antarctic ice caps are eroding, including speculation that the resulting sea
level rise could be as much as five meters by 2100.81 New Scientist describes
the consequences of such a possible increase as follows:
Without mega-engineering projects to protect them, a 5
meter rise would inundate large parts of many coastal
cities-including New York, London, Sydney, Vancouver,
Mumbai, and Tokyo-and leave surrounding areas vulner-
able to storm surges. In Florida, Louisiana, the Netherlands,
Bangladesh and elsewhere, whole regions and cities would
vanish. China's economic powerhouse, Shanghai, has an
average elevation of just 4 meters.82
Hansen et al. believe that the most likely and most critical of these dan-
gerous effects is the possibility of substantial sea level rise due to the
breakup of parts or all of the ice sheets covering Greenland and West
Antarctica. Taken together, Hansen et al. paint a rather alarming forecast
of what they view as the dangerous effect of global warming.83 Their words
could not be much more graphic or stark in their description of the risk
they believe we face:
Our concern that [business as usual greenhouse gas]
scenarios would cause large sea-level rise this century...
differs from estimates of the IPCC (2001, 2007), which fore-
sees little or no contribution to twenty-first century sea
level raise from Greenland and Antarctica. However, the
IPCC analyses and projections do not well account for the
nonlinear physics of wet ice sheet disintegration, ice streams
and eroding ice shelves, nor are they consistent with the
80Hansen et al., Climate Change and Trace Gases, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y
1925 (2007) [hereinafter Hansen et al., Climate Change].81 James Hansen, Scientific Reticence and Sea Level Rise, 2 ENVTL. RES. LETrERS 024002
(2007) [hereinafter Hansen, Scientific Reticence].2 James Hansen et al., Climate Catastrophe, NEW Sci. July 28, 2007, at 30, 34 [hereinafter
Hansen et al., Climate Catastrophe]; see also Hansen, Scientific Reticence, supra note 81.
' Hansen et al., Dangerous, supra note 69; Hansen et al., Climate Change, supra note
80; Hansen, Scientific Reticence, supra note 81.
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palaeoclimate evidence we have presented for the absence
of discernable lag between ice sheet forcing and sea-level
rise."'
Hansen et al. say ominously, "[Clivilization developed and constructed
extensive infrastructure, during a period of unusual climate stability, the
Holocene, now almost 12,000 years in duration. That period is about to
end.""5
As summarized in the quotes above, Hansen et al. are arguing that
the IPCC failed to take into account several non-linear factors that they
believe will result in a much more rapid disintegration of the GIS and
WAIS, which will result in a much more rapid than predicted rise in global
temperatures due to the resulting decreased albedo.8 6 Only by taking into
account these factors, they argue, is it possible to explain the observed
changes in climate over the last 400,000 years of repeated ice ages. They
point out that the terminations of each of the ice ages during this period
occurred very rapidly and that this observation needs to be taken into
account in any explanation.87
As of mid-2007, Hansen et al., however, believed that their con-
cerns could still be met through reductions in emissions of both CO 2 and
the other GHGs, but they did state that they believed we were then at the
outer limits of what can still be done to prevent the catastrophe that they
predict would otherwise occur."'
Hansen's argument can be summarized as follows: Excess heat is
largely going into the oceans, and some into the atmosphere. Warming
oceans thin or destroy ice shelves. When this happens, glaciers accelerate
when their "plug" is pulled. Ice shelves have been observed breaking up on
the Antarctic Peninsula and the Arctic. 9 Melting glaciers create melt-
water that lubricates glacial movement and decreases albedo on surface.9 °
Summer melt has increased in Greenland and West Antarctica.9' The
" Hansen et al., Climate Change, supra note 80, at 1950.
85 Id. at 1944.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1946-48.
8RId. at 1950.
8 9Larsen B Ice Shelf Collapses, supra note 54.
90 Some new research supports some aspects of this hypothesis. See Dorothy K Hall et
al., Greenland Ice Sheet Surface Temperature, Melt and Mass Loss: 2000-06, 54 J.
GLACIOLOGY 81, 91 (2008).
91 Hansen et al., Climate Change, supra note 80, at 1936.
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threat is that West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets will disintegrate.
The result would be a rapid and large rise in sea level (seven meters in the
case of Greenland alone).92 The problem he sees is that human infra-
structure located near sea level is vulnerable.93
Hansen et al. predict a catastrophic rise in sea level if temperatures
rise more than 1.8°C over pre-industrial levels but claim that by stringent
regulation of CO2 and the trace GHG gases it is still possible to avoid it.94
However, they do not explain exactly how this actually can be done. The
immediate question is whether their claims are credible that emissions
controls could be sufficient to solve the sea level rise threat they perceive.
This is where a recent paper by Rive et al.95 is particularly relevant. Rive
et al. generate emissions scenarios based on various temperature targets.
96
However, they ultimately conclude that any achievable temperature target
is not a useful tool for regulation given the uncertainty of climate sensi-
tivity.97 The larger question is whether the world should plunge ahead
with a reliance on ERD given that the risk of catastrophe appears to be
very large according to Hansen et al.'s analysis and the costs very high
as well.
If Hansen et al. are correct, the ERD strategy proposed by many
environmental groups, California, some Western European governments,
and some members of Congress, would appear to be rational only if ERD
could avoid dangerous climate changes. If not, this approach is likely to
result in the dangerous global climate changes about which these groups/
governments and the UNFCCC are most concerned. The four new papers
discussed above taken together suggest that ERD is not just ineffective
and inefficient, but may also not be a feasible approach to avoid ice sheet
disintegration given Hansen's assumptions.9" Hansen et al. are arguing
that the real climate sensitivity is roughly double99 that assumed by the
IPCC,"'0 which would bring it to about six degrees Celsius for a doubling
92 Julian A. Dowdeswell, The Greenland Ice Sheet and Global Sea Level Rise, 31 SCIENCE
963, 963 (2006).
9 Hansen et al., Climate Catastrophe, supra note 82.
9 Hansen et al., Dangerous, supra note 69, at 2306.
Nathan Rive et al., To What Extent Can A Long-Term Temperature Target Guide Near-
Term Climate Change Commitments?, 82 CLIMATIC CHANGE 373, 385-87 (2007).9 6 Id. at 378-81.
9 Id. at 385.
See infra Appendix 1, Case 3.a.
9 Hansen et al., Climate Change, supra note 80, at 1944.
10 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT, SUMMARYFOR POLICYMAKERS 21 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHEsIs REPORT].
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of CO2. The implementation feasibility diagrams presented by Rive et al.
show that the use of a two degrees Celsius temperature limit above pre-
industrial temperatures and a six degrees Celsius sensitivity lies so far out-
side the implementation possibilities they found as to be unachievable.,'o
The important point of this subsection is that ERD appears highly
unlikely to be able to avoid a GIS/WAIS disintegration such as the one that
Hansen has hypothesized. This subsection is not intended to argue when
or whether such an ice sheet disintegration may occur-only that ERD
would be powerless to avoid it if it would otherwise happen according to
Hansen's hypothesis.
b. Inability to Meet the European Union's 2*C Goal
In the second case, the threat/goal is derived from the UNFCCC
and the announced policy by the EU as to how it should be implemented.
The ultimate goal of climate change control, the UNFCCC has declared, is
to avoid Els. °2 This has generally been interpreted as a temperature
ceiling that if observed would accomplish this. The EU has explicitly
adopted a limit of two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels0 3 and
Germany, Britain, and Sweden have implicitly accepted it. °4 These four
Western European jurisdictions have all proposed implementing it, how-
ever, in ways that are unlikely to achieve the two degrees Celsius limit,0 5
possibly because they appreciate the difficulty of meeting it. California,
however, has used the limit as the basis for its climate change control legis-
lation,10 6 as have some of the bills that have been proposed in Congress.'
The history and scientific basis for the two degrees Celsius limit is briefly
summarized by Hansen et al.' and more extensively by Rive et al."
Others have also suggested that a two degrees Celsius warming is not likely
to be safe."0
101 Rive et al., supra note 95, at 382, Fig. 6; see also infra Appendix 1, Table 1.
102 Council of the European Union, supra note 74, at 2 (The EU's goal is to "prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system").
103 Id.
104 George Monbiot, The Rich World's Policy on Greenhouse Gas Now Seems Clear:
Millions Will Die, GUARDIAN, May 1, 2007, at 29.
105 Id.
106 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
38500 (Deering 2008).
'0 Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 3698, 110th Cong. (2006).
108 Hansen et al., Dangerous, supra note 69, at 2304-05.
'o Rive et al., supra note 95, at 376.
110 See generally J.B. Smith et al., Vulnerability to Climate Change and Reasons for
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Rive et al. analyze a range of possible limits on the rise in global
temperatures to determine the near-term emission reductions needed to
realize them using a variety of climate change parameters."' This section
primarily uses their methodology as a framework by which to assess the
feasibility of an emissions control approach to global climate change con-
trol in terms of limiting temperature increases to the levels specified in
each of the two threat/goal scenarios just outlined.
Even if climate sensitivity to increased CO 2 is what the IPCC says
it is, the modeling work by Rive et al. suggests that it would not only be
risky but also very expensive to actually achieve the two degrees Celsius
limit using ERD."1 They find that to obtain a mere fifty percent chance
of preventing more than a two degrees Celsius increase would require a
global cut of eighty percent from current industrial emission levels by
2050 at a marginal cost of $3,500 per ton of carbon equivalent assuming
average projections and "early action" to reduce GHGs."3 $3,500 is roughly
an order of magnitude higher than most previous estimates of marginal
costs, 114 presumably reflecting the extremely high cost of rapidly replacing
most of the energy producing and using capital stock. An eighty percent
cut would imply a reduction per person of about eighty-seven percent be-
low current levels because of predicted world population growth. 1 5 This
appears of very doubtful practicality, particularly at the extremely high
marginal costs estimated by Rive et al., and has a mere fifty percent chance
of "success" even in the "ideal" world of modeling. This suggests that in
the real world a serious effort to achieve such cuts would be extremely
Concern:A Synthesis, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY
(J.J. McCarthy et al. eds., 2001); WILLIAM HARE, WBGU-BERLIN, ASSESSMENT OF
KNOWLEDGE ON IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE-CONTRIBUTION TO THE SPECIFICATION OF
ART. 2 OF THE UNFCCC 89 (2003), available at http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu-sn2003_ex01
.pdf; ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (ACIA), IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC
CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2004).
"' Rive et al., supra note 95, at 378-85.
112 Id. at 383-87.
113 Id. at 385; infra Table 1. 1.8 gigatons of carbon equivalent ("GtCeq") is about eighty
percent of year 2000 emissions. In this and all their other cases, Rive et al. assume that
there will be no overshooting because they believe that overshooting might compromise
the overall objective. Id. at 378. Their term "'overshoot' refers to when a scenario exceeds
a given target (i.e., temperature) for a short period of time as a result of climate system
inertia, before eventually returning to the target level." Id. at 378 n.3. See also infra
Table 1.
" Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1452.
115 Alan Carlin, Risky Gamble, ENVTL. L. F., Sept-Oct. 2007, at 42,44 [hereinafter Carlin,
Risky Gamble].
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expensive, require worldwide cooperation and an early start, and be much
more likely to lead to catastrophe than success. Worst of all, it would prob-
ably postpone serious efforts to develop other approaches that would be
more likely to succeed. Rive et al. furthermore find that if we wait an
additional ten years to implement serious emissions reductions, a fifty
percent chance would not be achievable at all, again assuming "average"
projections." 6 For a seventy-five percent probability (which would seem
the least that humans might want to aspire to given the stakes involved)
and early action, the researchers find that the target of two degrees
Celsius is also not achievable. 117 A seventy-five percent probability could
be achieved if one accepts "low" projections, but still at a very high mar-
ginal cost ($1,400 per ton of carbon equivalent).118 It appears very unwise,
however, to gamble the fate of the world's climate on the lowest projec-
tions. It may be unwise to gamble it even on "average" projections. Using
a "high" estimate, however, the best that can be achieved is a twenty-five
percent probability at a marginal cost of $3,500 per ton of carbon equiv-
alent, according to Rive et al."9 The apparent implication is that, even
under a two degrees Celsius limit and three degrees Celsius sensitivity,
ERD is a very long shot with little real hope of meeting the two degrees
Celsius limit even before taking into account the wide gap that is almost
certain to exist between what is actually achieved and what countries and
their citizens may agree to do.
A recent study by Weaver et al. concluded that attempts at reduc-
ing GHG emissions (even ninety percent cuts below present levels) would
not avoid breaking of the two degrees Celsius "threshold" sooner or later.20
This further confirms the research discussed above.
There is a great danger that the world will attempt to make enor-
mous economic .sacrifices only to suffer all the adverse effects. In other
words, even if the world decides to greatly reduce GHG emissions and
proves willing to pay the enormous costs involved, there is little or no guar-
antee that it will not also have to pay for the economic damages that are
believed to result from global warming. If the GHG reductions actually
achieved (not the reductions promised by various politicians) should fall
116 Rive et al., supra note 95, at 385 tbl.2.
117 Id.
"
8 1Id. at 385 tbl.1.
119 Id.
"
0 Andrew J. Weaver et al., Long Term Climate Implications of2050 Emission Reduction
Targets, 34 GEOPHYSICAL REs. LETTERS L 19703 (2007), available at http://climate.uvic.ca/
people/alvaro/Emi_2050.pdf.
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short of what would ultimately prove necessary to avoid abrupt climate
changes (Els) this is a likely outcome if the GHG hypothesis of GW is
correct. The unfortunate result would be that the world would pay twice
and receive very little benefit. If, on the other hand, the ERD GHG emis-
sion reduction should prove to be more than what would be needed, the
world will waste very large resources that could be utilized for other
worthwhile purposes but might at least avoid dangerous climate changes.
Neither outcome would be very satisfactory, but the first would clearly
be worse than the second. Unfortunately, the first currently appears more
likely given the likelihood that any ERD approach would not be fully
implemented if the GHG hypothesis is correct. 2'
Time may or may not be short. Based on current information the
IPCC appears overly conservative in its Arctic projections. Hansen et al.
have argued that there is really already 0.6°C more warming already
locked into the warming pipeline.'22 If Hansen should prove to be correct,
the world only has a margin of 0.4*C' not already locked in before reach-
ing his limit-perhaps twenty years at recent rates according to his analy-
sis. If the EU is right, we only have 0.6'C not already locked in according
to Hansen's analysis.'24 And on matters of such import, we might be wise
not to push our luck. Getting the world to agree to anything in say a few
years is next to impossible. Even if they did, implementation would be a
major problem. And even if it were not, the needs are almost certain to
change.
Global warming (or possibly even cooling) will occur if Earth's
energy balance is not stabilized. If this is not achieved, catastrophes are
a credible possibility. New Orleans could even turn out to be a minor blip
compared to what may happen in the future. Nature's balance of energy
that flows into and out of the Earth is very precise since nature does not
fudge, as humans are sometimes inclined to do. Furthermore, the system
creating this balance is very complicated and changing with major un-
certainties. It needs ongoing fine adjustments, not inflexible, internation-
ally negotiated "planning" goals formulated decades in advance using
models that will never be able to take into account the full complexity of
the Earth's climate system.
121 See infra Section I.D.
122 James Hansen, Is There Still Time to Avoid Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference
with Global Climate?, Presentation at the American Geophysical Union, Chart 22 (Dec. 6,
2005), available at http'/www.columbia.edu/-jehl/keeling-talk-and-slides.pdf.
' 1.8"C minus 0.8"C (already realized) minus 0.6°C (already in the pipeline). See id.
124 2C minus 0.8°C (already realized) minus 0.6*C already in the pipeline according to
Hansen. Id.
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There are many technical uncertainties. In time, Hansen may
prove to be right or wrong or even partially correct. But it appears cred-
ible that he could be right, so do we want to risk a catastrophe with ERD?
Two degrees Celsius may or may not be the "tipping point." But should we
accept at best a fifty percent probability of avoiding it using ERD if it is?
The IPCC may be right or wrong in their climate sensitivity estimate. But
are we so sure that sensitivity is less than or equal to 3.1*C to risk using
ERD? The Arctic (or even the world) may or may not continue warming.
But the potential consequences if it does are so serious that we may not
want to risk it. Prudence is to select a control approach that will handle
all major credible risks, particularly if costs are very much lower. ERD is
not such an approach, although it may be able to make a contribution if
its limitations are understood and if it is used where such remedies can
be justified for other reasons.
4. Can Have Major Adverse and Other Environmental Effects
Two new studies published in 2008 in Science conclude that when
all the effects of growing biofuels are taken into account all biofuels studied
result in greater GHG emissions than using petroleum-based fuels.'25
Since biofuels have a variety of adverse environmental effects, the decision
to subsidize biofuels in the United States and elsewhere, appears to be an
example of the unintended consequences of ERD programs where politi-
cians are prone to select winners rather than leaving the choice to mar-
kets. Even if regulations are written to require that certain particularly
harmful biofuels not be subsidized, the same result still may occur because
the increase in world prices for other biofuels results in the diversion of
land to these other biofuels. This further results in the expansion of acre-
age devoted to the particularly harmful biofuels, as well, at the expense
of other environmental values.
Even if biofuels contributed to a reduction in GHG emissions, they
may have important adverse environmental effects that would exceed any
benefits from the reduced use of other fuels. Increased use of biofuels can
also have adverse non-environmental effects. Examples include the ex-
pansion of oil palm plantations at the expense of rainforests and driving
125 Joseph Fargione et al., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, Scd. EXPRESS,
Feb. 7 2008, at 1235-36; Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels
Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land Use Change, SCI. EXPRESS,
Feb. 7, 2008, at 1238-39.
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up prices for food particularly in countries where food represents a major
proportion of household expenses. 126 Even where efforts are made to avoid
the expansion of particularly harmful biofuels production, there may be
adverse spillover effects into other agricultural products that can serve
as substitutes for those whose use as biofuels is being expanded. Greater
use or proposed use of corn for biofuels appears to have already resulted
in higher prices for corn 127 and the substitution of some other product for
other uses which may have adverse environmental or other effects.
Another example of trading off decreased emission of GHGs for
other environmental risks is provided by the possibility that expanded
nuclear power could be substituted for fossil fuel-based energy sources. 2
As demonstrated by Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, however, there may
be major environmental risks in such a substitution.'2 9 Given the neces-
sary role that must be played by politicians in any ERD approach, it is
not unlikely that radically increasing biofuel use may not be the last un-
intended adverse effect of ERD use.
5. Uncertainties Concerning GHG Hypothesis Do Not Justify
Large Investments in ERD Until They Are Better Resolved
There are many reasons for not pursuing the current push to con-
trol climate change by using ERD, but one of the fundamental reasons
is that we simply do not know enough and may never know enough to
sufficiently and accurately predict that the actions proposed would solve
the problem. As discussed in introductory Section C above, it is becoming
increasingly clear that there may be some additional factors influencing
global temperatures beyond those considered by the IPCC. It is too early
to reach definite conclusions, but it may also be too early to invest in ERD
for the sole purpose of reducing impacts on humans (E2) or avoiding abrupt
climate changes (Els) to the extent that it cannot be justified on other
126 Food prices have risen substantially recently, which some believe is due in part to in-
creased use ofbiofuels. See The New Face of Hunger, ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 2008, at 32-34,
as well as other related articles in the same issue. For a discussion of the adverse environ-
mental effects of palm oil expansion, see Elizabeth Rosenthal, Once a Dream Fuel, Palm
Oil May Be an Eco-Nightmare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at C1.
127 The New Face of Hunger, supra note 126.
12 Patrick Moore, Going Nuclear: A Green Makes the Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2006,
at BO.
129Anniversary Lessons from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, ENVT. NEWS SERVICE,
Mar. 26, 2004, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2004/2004-03-26-03.asp.
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grounds besides GW reduction. Some emissions reductions can be justified
in terms of improved national security130 and profitable increases in energy
efficiency. 13' But, if it turns out that there are other significant factors
(such as variations in the Sun's magnetic field or other characteristics)
that explain some of the GW in the late twentieth century, there appears
to be a significant risk that investments in ERD justified only for the pur-
pose of GW reduction may be partially or even entirely wasted. Scientific
consensus about uncertain effects does not prove scientific validity.
The proponents of ERD argue that whatever the uncertainties in
the significance of GHGs in explaining climate change, it is imperative
that we start a serious ERD program immediately because of the long
period required for it to become effective in reducing the growth of atmo-
spheric GHGs. As will be discussed in Section III below, however, there is
an alternative approach that does not require a long period to become effec-
tive, so there is little risk in terms of E1 and E2 involved in waiting until
the evidence becomes clearer as long as the alternative is developed to the
point that it could be used in an optimized form if it should be needed.
B. Inflexibility-Inability to Respond Rapidly to New Information
and Circumstances
Because all international ERD approaches currently under consid-
eration require that GHG emission reduction targets be established far
in advance, often ten to even forty years in advance, and because of the
difficulty of rapidly changing these targets if international agreements
must be renegotiated on the basis of new information, it is very safe to con-
clude that ERD would have difficulty responding rapidly to new circum-
stances or research information. 3 2 As outlined in introductory Section C
above, however, such new information is coming forth all the time, and
in some cases appears to be of great significance with regard to what GHG
emission reductions would appear to be necessary.
130 Such as by reducing dependence on imported energy supplies consistent with the
economic value of the resulting improvement in natural security. See Marc A. Levy, Is
the Environment a National Security Issue? 20 INTL SEC. 35 (1995).
131 Some believe that significant increases in energy efficiency can be profitable. See, e.g.,
JON CREYTS ET AL., MCKINSEY & COMPANY, REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS:
How MUCH AT WHAT COST (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/
ccsi/pdf/USghgfinalreport.pdf.
112 If a cap-and-trade approach was used to implement ERD there could be moderately
rapid changes within those countries adopting such an approach. The problem arises in
changing the control goals between nations in response to new information or circumstances.
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Suppose, for example, that a Kyoto follow-on protocol is eventually
agreed upon that involves significant reductions in GHG emissions by
almost all nations and is eventually by ratified by all these nations. Sup-
pose it later develops that the agreed upon reductions are much too small
to avoid major dangerous effects of global warming or there is unforeseen
rapid warming in the Arctic or the agreed upon goals are not fully imple-
mented. Under these circumstances it would appear very difficult to rapidly
repeat the international negotiation process to avoid the resulting adverse
effects.
On the opposite side, suppose that the sun enters a period similar
to the Dalton minimum 33 in the next few years, and temperatures start
plunging just as they did during the Little Ice Age. And suppose that the
world had just agreed on a very ambitious program of ERD controls.
Would those who worked so hard to bring this about be willing to admit
that the sun does play a major role in the Earth's climate and that ERD
was only making cooling worse? Would they further recommend that all
the ERD controls be abandoned immediately and that most expenditures
for GHG control to that date had made the situation worse rather than
better? I doubt it.
Now, although these two scenarios are not implausible, they may
be somewhat unlikely. But there actually is a strong expectation that at
least one very significant climate forcing factor will change, and there is
always a possibility that others will as well. The expectation relates to
major volcanic eruptions, which often put sulfate particles into the strato-
sphere, and have the effect of decreasing the solar radiation received on
Earth for a period of a year or more following the eruptions.' During such
eruptions, humans need a warmer rather than a cooler Earth if crop losses
and other adverse effects of cooling are to be avoided. ERD would be less
than helpful in this regard since, if effective, it would presumably make
the world even colder than it otherwise would have been.
In summary, there are many circumstances where the inflexibility
of ERD would make it very counterproductive in terms of solving either
El or E2. There are even plausible circumstances where ERD would make
these problems worse, not better.
133 The Dalton Minimum was a period of low sun spot activity occurring between the
1790s and 1820s. K. Mursula et al., Geomagnetic Activity During the Dalton Minimum:
New Evidence for the Lost Cycle, 5 GEOPHYSICAL RES. ABSTRACTS 10,361 (2003).
"' Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1424-27, 1476.
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C. Extremely Expensive
The marginal cost of implementing ERD programs depends both
on the objectives sought as well as on the climate sensitivity assumed. As
discussed in Section I.A.3(b) above, Rive et al. show that it would be ex-
tremely expensive and quite risky to avoid a two degrees Celsius thresh-
old for abrupt climate changes (Els) by using ERD assuming commonly
accepted sensitivity factors.'35 More ambitious objectives are either not
achievable or would be even more costly.136 An earlier paper found that,
although there may be some low cost or even free partial remedies, efforts
to substantially reduce emissions would be very expensive.' 37 Table 1 at
the end of the main text presents a brief summary of the costs of using
ERD. It assumes that the objective of using ERD would be to avoid abrupt
climate changes (E ls) by keeping temperatures from increasing more than
two degrees Celsius from pre-industrial levels. It also assumes current
assumptions as to the climate sensitivity factor.
D. Politically Unrealistic
ERD places heavy demands on the political systems where it would
be implemented. There are strong economic incentives not to reduce GHG
emissions. These incentives could be changed by governmental action,
but they are so fundamental that this would prove to be difficult, as illus-
trated by the problems many EU countries and Canada have found in
meeting their commitments under Kyoto, 3 ' politicians would be required
to maintain unusually strong resolve as the population learns what would
be the real effects of the measures. Under current circumstances, politi-
cians can argue that higher energy prices are a result of the operation of
the laws of supply and demand. But if markedly higher prices or energy
use restrictions were imposed for the purpose of reducing global warming,
they would face a tougher situation.
135 Rive et al., supra note 95, at 385.
136 The cost of controlling Els using ERD under two assumptions is discussed in some
detail supra Section I.A.3.
137 Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2.
138 Andrew Osborn, EU Nowhere Near Meeting Kyoto Targets, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 3,
2003, at 13. Friends of the Earth sued Canada for failing to uphold its obligations under
Kyoto. Dianne Saxe, Kyoto Violations Could Be Costly to Canada, RECORD (Kitcher-
Waterloo, Ontario), Dec. 18, 2007, at A9.
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It is difficult to see why politicians would be willing to force their
constituents to adopt unpopular and expensive constraints on their activ-
ities, or why many constituents would not pursue every available loophole
rather than reduce their welfare and freedom of choice. Global warming
has all the psychological characteristics-a long time horizon, uncertainty,
and few readily apparent effects to remind people that there is a problem
in their everyday lives-needed to keep it at a modest level of priority,
even with a huge public education campaign.
ERD appears to be politically unrealistic for three reasons: (1) The
proposed GHG reductions are highly unrealistic; (2) they are unlikely to
be successfully implemented; and (3) the goals are unrelated to people's
normal experience.
1. Proposed GHG Reductions Highly Unrealistic
A number of the ERD bills currently in the U.S. Congress require
an eighty percent reduction in GHG emissions, usually compared to 1990,
and often by 2050.139 With more than twenty-five percent increases in
world energy use emissions between 1990 and 2004,140 this would require
reductions of over eighty-four percent from current levels. With projected
population growth, this would require about an eighty-nine percent reduc-
tion in emissions per person worldwide even ignoring economic growth.'
Another way of looking at this problem is the reduction in energy use
thought to be needed to achieve the goals of this proposed legislation. Even
when future economic growth is left out of the calculation, global energy
efficiency per person would have to be increased by roughly eighty-nine
percent or human services provided by energy use reduced by eighty-nine
percent per person, or some combination of the two. 142 Energy efficiency
can be increased, but only slowly, and at considerable cost for the more
aggressive measures.
139 See, e.g., Climate Change and Energy Bills Introduced in the 110th Congress, Heritage
Foundation, httpJ/www.heritage.orgtresearchdenergyandenvironmentupload/bg2075_table
.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
140 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., REPORT No. DOEEIA-0573, EMIssIONS OF GREENHOUSE
GASES REPORT (2007), available at httpJ/www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt#global (under
"US Emissions in a Global Perspective").
14' Assuming world population of 6.371 billion in 2004 and 9.393 billion in 2050, based on
current population projections of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Database,
http://www.census.gov/ipcwww/idb/ranks.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
142 Carlin, Risky Gamble, supra note 115, at 44.
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Alternatively, the use of energy services could be reduced, either
voluntarily or by government mandate. This would probably be even more
difficult. The rapid growth in energy services seems likely to overwhelm
any other savings. More computers, more server farms, and more cell
phones appear to be quite likely by 2050, to take only a few examples of
likely increased energy use services.'43 One proposal for reducing such
services, for example, is to reduce per capita average vehicle-miles traveled
from 10,000 annually to 5,000 through better urban design, mass transit,
and telecommuting."M But to entice drivers to forgo half their trips would re-
quire monumental incentives; the more likely prospect is non-achievement,
or possibly coercion. The even more drastic proposal for individual emission
rationing reported to be under consideration in Great Britain a few years
ago is a logical extension of the ERD approach, 4 ' but it is difficult to see
how it would attract much support. While increased energy efficiency
may eventually contribute significantly, the deep cuts in energy services
that would appear to be required to reduce total emissions by eighty-nine
percent per person worldwide are politically unrealistic. In fact, they are
highly unrealistic.
Meeting the goals of these proposals using ERD is either im-
possible, or very expensive and risky, assuming the current estimates of
needed reductions (we do not really know, however, which reductions are
needed because we cannot reasonably determine the climate sensitivity
factor in advance). The limited experience to date is that those jurisdic-
tions with some of the most active energy conservation programs, such
as California and Britain, have been roughly holding their own in recent
1" See ENERGY SAVING TRUST, THE AMPERE STRIKES BACK: How CONSUMER ELECTRONICS
ARE TAKING OVER THE WORLD 3 (2007), available at http://www.sustenergy.orglUserFiles/
File/ampere strikes-back.pdf(projecting that by 2020 combined consumer electronics and
the information and communication technology sectors are expected to use forty-five
percent of the electricity used in British homes excluding electric heating).
1 Stephen W. Pacala & Robert H. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate
Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 970 (2004).
This particular proposal would probably only reduce GHG emissions if the users actually
reduced their miles traveled by any means resulting in GHG emissions rather than using
mass transit. A new study argues that rail transit uses more energy per passenger mile
and that many generate more GHGs than the average passenger automobile, and that
buses are even less efficient. Randal O'Toole, Does Rail Transit Save Energy or Reduce
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, CATO INST., Apr. 14, 2008, at 1.
14 See David Adam, Swipe-Card Plan To Ration Consumers' Carbon Use, GUARDIAN, July
19, 2006, at 10, available at http'//www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,,1823853
,00.html.
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years-i.e., a reduction of zero percent.146 Given economic and population
growth and the proliferation of energy use services, this may be the most
that could actually be achieved by ERD. Even if more can be achieved in
particular countries, it would not approach the eighty-four percent needed
on a worldwide basis according to a number of the proposed bills. Except
under special circumstances, such as the collapse of Eastern European
industry after 1989,'4 most countries have experienced a gradual increase
in emissions, and some are growing rapidly.148 Most less developed coun-
tries have also been unwilling or unable to participate in emission cuts. 4 9
More than governmental cooperation would be needed. The idea that all
the people of the world would cooperate to make something this effective
happen is extremely unlikely.
A new study summarizes the situation as follows:
Ifwe wish to reduce CO 2 emissions to 80 percent below 1990
levels, whether U.S. or global, we are faced with three al-
ternatives: radically restrict our energy use, most likely
through strict rationing; reduce our population by two-
thirds; or, invent or intensively develop low-carbon, carbon-
neutral or carbon-negative sources of energy, such as
geothermal, tidal and nuclear power. The third option has
numerous technical and political sticking points, but it is
the only one which does not require a culture and economy
more rigorously policed than those of the centralized com-
mand systems of the old Soviet Union and People's Republic
' Between 1990 and 1999 California GHG emissions increased slightly according to Terry
Surles, California Energy Commission, Presentation at Kyoto Japan: California Activities
Addressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://energy.ca.gov/
pier/papers-presentations/2002-1--24_Gas-Emissions.ppt. United Kingdom CO2 emissions
based on the more comprehensive environmental accounts basis have shown little change
between 1990 and 2005 according to NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, UK GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS: MEASUREMENT AND REPORTING (2008), available at nao.org.uk/publications/
0708_greenhouse-gas emissions.pdf.
147 Matthew Wald, Carbon Dioxide Emissions Dropped in 1990, Ecologists Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1991, at 17.
'" For a list ofeach country's carbon emissions, see Carbon Dioxide Emissions (CO2 ), Metric
Tons of C02 Per Capita, Millennium Development Goals Indicator, http://mdgs.un.org/
unsd/mdg/seriesDetail.aspx?srid=751&crid= (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
'
49 See James Kanter & Andrew C. Revkin, Binding Emissions Treaty Still a Possibility,
U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/200802/27/world/
europe/27climate.html?_r=l&ref=europe&oref=slogin; OECD, OECD ENVIRONMENTAL
OUTLOOK TO 2030: SUMMARY IN ENGLISH 6 (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/29/33/40200582.pdf.
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of China. In short, technology is the only feasible and
humane means to both reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and maintain an acceptable standard of living. 5 '
Others are less optimistic as to how feasible even the technological
approach may be. 5 '
The situation may actually be much worse since anthropogenic
emissions may eventually have to be reduced to zero if the adverse effects
of GW are to be avoided. According to Pierre Friedlingstein's writing in
Nature, "[T]o stabilize climate the concentration of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere must be stabilized, and to do so... anthropogenic emis-
sions will eventually need to be reduced to zero. " 15 2 Professors H. Damon
Matthews and Ken Caldeira agree: "Our results suggest that future anthro-
pogenic emissions would need to be eliminated in order to stabilize global-
mean temperatures."'53 Unfortunately, most scholars believe that this is
a practical impossibility in the modem world. Matthews and Caldeira dis-
agree. Caldeira claims, "It is just not that hard to solve the technological
challenges. We can develop and deploy wind turbines, electric cars, and
so on, and live well without damaging the environment."'54 Although it
may or may not eventually prove theoretically possible to eliminate carbon
emissions through advanced technology, the cost of doing so both economi-
cally and politically make this an unattainable goal. The idea that develop-
ing countries, can or actually would, undertake such a drastic technological
change when they now object to doing anything to reduce GHG emissions
is not realistic.
The obvious question, if these three authors are correct that emis-
sions reductions would have to approach zero, is whether it is even worth
starting down the ERD path for reducing El and E2? Partial reductions
in GHG emissions may do no harm, but if they ultimately will not solve
150 Considerations for an 80% Reduction in Carbon Dioxide Emissions, MARSHALL INST.
POL'Y OUTLOOK, Jan. 2008, at 6, available at http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/
572.pdf.
151 See generally Martin I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate
Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCIENCE 981 (2002).
152 Pierre Friedlingstein, A Steep Road to Climate Stabilization, 451 NATURE 297, 298
(2008).
'
5 H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Stabilizing Climate Requires Near-Zero Emissions,
35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L04705 (2007).
" Press Release, Carnegie Inst. for Sci., Stabilizing Climate Requires Near-Zero Emissions
(Feb. 15, 2008), available at httpJ/www.ciw.edu/news/stabilizing-climate_requires-near
_zerocarbonemissions.
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El and E2, other approaches would have to be used in the end anyway.
So why start unless it is justifiable on other grounds?
2. Unlikely to Be Successfully Implemented 55
ERD assumes that every nation, including most people and other
entities in these nations, will cooperate with emission reduction goals
established through some sort of voluntary international agreement. This
appears very unlikely given the history of voluntary international cooper-
ation between nations.'56 If only a few economically significant nations do
not cooperate or actively enforce whatever ERD plan may be agreed upon,
the eighty percent reductions would have to be increased even more in the
remaining countries in order to achieve the worldwide reductions now
being proposed. And if even one economically significant nation does not
cooperate or does not implement effective enforcement, there is likely to
be a movement of high GHG emitting industries from countries that do
cooperate to those that do not, with a resulting loss ofjobs and income, and
strong political opposition by those displaced. Even the threat of effective
GHG reductions and enforcement thereof is likely to result in serious
political opposition and probably retreat by the governments involved.'57
Since a substantial share of GHG emissions reductions would have to oc-
cur as a result of individual and corporate actions to either reduce energy
services or to make energy use more efficient, the results would also sub-
stantially depend on individual and corporate decision-making (as well
as any other economic entity or local government entities responsible for
energy use decisions). National governments can change the incentives
for energy use decisions, but are largely powerless in democratic countries
to change individual, corporate, and other entity behavior if such behavior
does not respond to governmental incentives. An immediate question is
how strong of incentives that democratic governments would be willing to
impose. Since the effects of price increases would appear to most citizens
as a kind of tax increase, politicians are likely to have a strong aversion
155 See Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1431-45 (providing more
detail on some of these points).
156 Id. at 1442-43.
'7 This process appears to be starting in Europe in early 2008 as a result of proposals by
the European Union to require Europe's steel, chemical, and power sectors to buy permits
for their GHG emissions. See EU Ready to Cut Energy-Intensive Industries Some Slack
from Climate Change Package, INT'L HERALD TRiE., Feb. 21, 2008, available at httpJ/www
.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/21business/EU-FIN-EU-Climate-Change.php.
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to such incentives.158 Even if a nation agrees to a particular GHG reduction
goal, that does not guarantee that the nation will actually achieve this
goal. In fact, many if not most participating Annex I countries in the Kyoto
Protocol appear unlikely to meet their commitments.'59 Another example
is the protection of intellectual property; many nations have agreed to
protect it, but some nations provide much more effective protection than
others do. 160 Even if all governments agreed to voluntary international
standards for GHG emissions, different governments would be likely to im-
plement them in different ways, which would probably have widely vary-
ing results. There is no obvious reason why the results would be any more
effective in reducing GHG emissions than the Kyoto Protocol. They might
well be less since many less developed countries would have to be involved,
which presumably have less capability to bring about actual energy use
reductions than the participating Annex I nations.
Recent fossil fuel emissions have not been very encouraging despite
all the worldwide discussion of reducing GHG emissions. In fact, depend-
ing on the data source used, emissions have been higher than or equal to
the most pessimistic scenarios proposed by the IPCC in the period 2004
to 2006.6
Finally there are the already apparent disagreements between the
developed countries and the less developed countries over GHG emissions
control. Since almost every country would have to participate in order to
make the controls effective (based on current knowledge and assumptions,
of course), the less enthusiastic countries would have to be persuaded to
implement such controls. This could be done either through direct in-
ternational agreements or by example. The problem with the example
approach is that once a country or group of countries have "led by example"
they would have much less bargaining power in any international ne-
gotiation, while their example would not have sufficient effect on total
worldwide emissions to solve the climate change problems.
" For a real life example of this see Jonathan Oliver, Tories Ditch Green Taxes, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Feb. 24,2008, available at http//www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/
article3416624.ece.
159 Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1431.
160 See U.S.: China Has High Rate of Intellectual Property Infringement, WASH. FILE,
Apr. 29, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2005/Apr/29-580129.html (noting
several countries that are listed on the U.S. Trade Representative's "priority watch list"
for intellectual property rights violations).
161 For 2004 to 2005 data see Michael R. Raupach et al., Global and Regional Drivers of
Accelerating CO2 Emissions, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 10,288, 10,289 (2007) (relying
on Figure 1). For added data points for 2005 to 2006 data, see Schrag Presentation, supra
note 7, at 20.
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3. Goals Unrelated to People's Normal Experience
One reason that ERD would be likely to experience great difficulty
is that the effects experienced by the average person are likely to remain
difficult to ascertain and measure by the average person. Many in tem-
perate climates may even welcome warmer temperatures because of the
increased number of warm days each year. If objectives are defined as
parts per million of atmospheric CO 2 or a reduction in the rate of growth
in GHG emissions, these objectives are well beyond the capability of most
people to either understand or measure. With no such readily apparent
benchmarks, most people would tend to discount the risk and as a result
may be less than willing to make sacrifices to achieve them. Politicians
who may propose such sacrifices are not likely to be popular either. This
problem with using ERD will be discussed in much more detail in Section II
below.
E. Summary of Reasons Why ERD Would Be Unlikely to Prevent
Dangerous Climate Changes
This Article does not argue for or against the widely accepted GHG
hypothesis of the cause of GW. Rather, it argues that there is substantial
uncertainty and that even if the hypothesis is correct and the currently
accepted parameters of climate sensitivity are correct that ERD is highly
unlikely to be able to solve El and E2. It further argues that ERD is not
an effective or efficient means to do so. Unfortunately, current knowledge
does not allow us to determine the accuracy of the hypothesis. But if the
GHG problem is not as serious as many currently believe, there is also
less reason to pursue GHG reductions than currently believed.
If changes in GHG levels are a significant factor in GW, there
would be a great danger of attempting to make enormous economic sacri-
fices using ERD only to suffer all the adverse effects. Because of the prob-
lems outlined in Section I, global warming would continue until Earth's
energy balance was stabilized. Catastrophes might occur-New Orleans
might prove to be only a very minor blip if the GIS or WAIS continue to
melt. This balance is very precise-nature does not fudge. The system
creating this balance is very complicated and has major uncertainties. It
needs frequent fine adjustments, not inflexible, internationally negotiated
"planning" goals formulated far in advance. It requires the cooperation
of most nations, corporations, and people to be implemented successfully.
ERD has important similarities to economic central planning, but probably
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worse-world central planning without world government. Voluntary in-
ternational agreements such as are now proposed have not always been
successful; examples include the Kyoto Protocol and the Kellogg-Briand
Treaty. The latter committed the signatories not to use war as an instru-
ment of national policy.
On the other hand, if the GHG hypothesis is not a significant ex-
planation of GW pursuit of ERD would not control temperature increases
or avoid dangerous climate changes. It would simply waste resources
(except when justified for other reasons) reducing GHG emissions that
could be more efficiently used for other purposes and postpone the time
when effective action would be taken to solve these problems.
Finally, if GHGs are less of an influence on climate than the IPCC
believes, reducing atmospheric GHGs would have lower benefits and
would not be as effective at preventing abrupt non-linear climate changes
(El) and climate change's direct effects on temperatures (E2) as the IPCC
predicts. Given all the problems implementing ERD, it would probably
be better to use a control approach that influences or counteracts the other
factors that influence El and E2.
More generally, the GHG hypothesis of GW may or may not prove
to be a significant explanation for GW. Since there is an alternative ap-
proach162 that can be used to control El and E2 rapidly and at much lower
cost, there is little to be gained by rushing to a decision until the science
becomes clearer. Hansen may prove to be right or wrong. We do not cur-
rently know enough to judge. But it appears credible that he could be
right; so do we want to risk a catastrophe by using ERD to solve a problem
that it apparently could not solve? Two degrees Celsius may or may not
be an important "tipping point.""3 But should we accept at best a fifty
percent probability of avoiding this "tipping point" using ERD?'" IPCC
may be right or wrong in their estimate of climate sensitivity. But are we
sure enough that sensitivity is 3. I°C to risk using ERD?'65 Prudence is to
select a control approach that will handle all credible risks, particularly
if costs are much lower. ERD is not such an approach. There is a great
danger of making enormous economic sacrifices to reduce GHG emissions
only to suffer all the adverse effects if either the effects of GHG emissions
have been underestimated or if future possible agreements upon goals for
162 See generally infra Section III.
16 Council of the European Union, supra note 74, at 2.
1See Rive et al., supra note 95, at 385.
165 IPCC, SYNTHEsis REPORT, supra note 100, at 21.
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GHG reductions are not realized. It is possible, of course, that if ERD is
pursued that every country would pursue the most cost-effective remedies
first with high payoffs in terms of improved national security and profit-
ability as well as in GHG reductions, so that the losses might be minimized.
Given the experience with bio-fuels to date, however, just the opposite may
occur too since politics, not economics, may prevail. 6'
II. NEW GOALS NEEDED DIRECTLY RELATED TO EFFECTS PEOPLE
UNDERSTAND
For a number of years, climate change control has been understood
as a single problem with a single solution. The widely proposed solution
has been to reduce GHG emissions, whether by implementing an enhanced
Kyoto Protocol, various proposals by Al Gore, or various bills in Congress.
A much more useful description of the problem is that when the
Earth is warming it is receiving more radiation energy than it is losing,
which is the basic cause of increasing global temperatures.'67 This energy
is stored in various reservoirs: oceans, land, and atmosphere. 68 If not cor-
rected either by man or nature, it is possible that the climate system may
get "out of control" with unknown but probably catastrophic consequences.
The solution is to bring Earth's radiation balance into equilibrium. The
most important question is where that equilibrium should be. From an
economic viewpoint, the answer is the level that maximizes the net eco-
nomic benefits of control. Unfortunately, we have only a limited under-
standing of many of the economic benefits of control, so this definition
may be difficult to implement. This section will explore some of the more
practical alternatives.
" See supra Section I.A.4; see also James R. Healey, E85 Does Poorly in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, USATODAY, Nov. 30,2007, at 7A (publishing research that shows that E85 fuel
is less cost-effective than diesel). Despite this evidence, the U.S. Government supports
the proliferation of ethanol fuels. For example, President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act
of 2005. A press release announcing the signing stated that "[tihe bill includes a flexible,
cost-effective renewable fuel standard that will double the amount of ethanol and biodiesel
in our fuel supply over the next seven years." Press Release, White House, President Bush
Signs Energy Policy Act (Aug. 8, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/
08/20050808-6.html.
167 Finds Increasing Solar Trend That Can Change Climate, NASA, Mar. 20, 2003,
http://www.nasa.gov/centers/goddard/news/topstory/2003/0313irradiance.html
[hereinafter NASA Study].
168 WILLIAM KININMOUTH, CLIMATE CHANGE: A NATURAL HAZARD 77 (2004); James Hansen
et al., Earth's Energy Imbalance: Confirmation and Implications 308 SCIENCE 1431 (2005).
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In addition the acidity of the oceans has been rising due to higher
atmospheric CO 2 levels.'69 The solution to the ocean acidity problem is to
either bring down CO 2 levels or to find ways to directly change ocean pH
levels.170
A. Basic Problem: Earth's Radiation Imbalance
Until radiation balance is achieved, global temperatures will
increase or decrease. A chart (Figure 1) prepared by NASA's Goddard
Institute for Space Sciences (currently headed by James Hansen) shows
the major factors, or "climate forcings" as the physicists call them, that
they believe are influencing the radiation balance. 7' It should be noted
that this chart shows greenhouse gases as a very strong and rapidly in-
creasing forcing factor, consistent with Hansen's views.'72 For the reasons
discussed in Section I.C and II.A.1 above, this depends critically on a num-
ber of assumptions, which may or may not prove to be accurate. But it
does present a simple way of looking at some of the major factors thought
to influence GW.
All attempts to reduce global warming must change one of these
forcings if they are to be successful. Almost all proposals to do so have
involved reducing the forcing resulting from greenhouse gases (the top line
in Figure 1(a)) through ERD. Decreasing GHG levels in the atmosphere
should indeed decrease the net climate forcing, although the extent is
unclear. An alternative is to find ways to reflect more of the incoming
radiation to the Earth back into space before it reaches Earth' 7' through
SRM using added aerosols in the stratosphere (the bottom jagged line in
Figure l(a))."'74 Both would push climate forcings towards equilibrium
when global temperatures are rising.
169 ROYAL Soc'y, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE
vi (2005), available at http://royalsociety.org/displaypage.doc.asp?id=13539.
170 See id. at 37.
171 See infra Figure 1.
171 See id.; see also James Hansen et al., Climate Forcings in the Industrial Era, 95 PROC.
NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 12,753, 12,757 (1998).
173 Altering Earth's radiation balance has been discussed by scholars and climate experts
since 1979. Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1447.
171 See infra Figure 1. Figure 2(b) infra clearly shows the effects of the increased strato-
spheric aerosols resulting from major volcanic eruptions on global temperatures. SRM as
discussed in the Article would simply enhance this effect. For a discussion of using aerosols
to reflect solar radiation see Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1459-63;
Paul Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to
Resolve a PolicyDilemma?, 7 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211, 212 (2006); T.M.L. Wigley,A Combined
Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate Stabilization, 314 SCIENCE 452 (2006).
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B. Where to Balance Forcings?
A very interesting question is how to select the extent to which the
climate forcings should be reduced. For a number of years, GHG control
advocates attempted to determine the GHG emission reductions on the
basis of their computations using prevailing assumptions as to climate
sensitivity of the reductions needed to keep global temperatures from ex-
ceeding a specified increase from pre-industrial levels, usually two degrees
Celsius.'75 As this has become increasingly difficult to achieve with rising
atmospheric GHG levels, the objective appears to have been transformed
into percentage reductions of GHG emissions by a specified year.'76 Since
such reductions should really be means rather than ends, however, there
is no obvious justification for this. As mentioned, the economic ideal is to
maximize the net economic benefits of control. Benefits are very hard to
measure due to varying views by different groups of people and the need
to assume a climate sensitivity as well as the usual measurement prob-
lems encountered in any effort to determine economic benefits. But if this
is difficult or even practically impossible to determine, then one interesting
possibility is to explore measurable objectives corresponding to each major
effect of global warming to see if there are some useful ones. Since the
costs of control using SRM are very small and largely fixed,'77 the degree
of control should depend almost entirely on the benefits of various levels.
Different countries and people will have different benefits for different
temperatures. Trying to balance all that using formal economic analysis
would be very difficult and beyond our current capabilities. Benefits oftem-
perature stabilization are very hard to measure due to varying views and
the need to assume a climate sensitivity as well as the usual measurement
problems.
There are basically two ways to balance climate forcings. Humans
could decrease GHG concentrations in the atmosphere or reflect more of
the incoming radiation back into space. 7 ' Decreasing GHG concentrations
would decrease heat retained by the Earth and, thus, lower global temper-
atures. But this is likely to be only a very long-term solution since many
GHGs remain in the atmosphere for a very long time,'79 and, unless they
175 See Council of the European Union, supra note 74, at 2.
176 See, e.g., Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2008).
177 See Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1496.
171 See id. at 1414-15.
179 See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Greenhouse Gases: Frequently
Asked Questions, http://lwf.ncdc.gov/oa/climate/gases.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2008).
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are removed from the atmosphere, the GHG forcing will also continue for
a very long time. If, on the other hand, more incoming radiation is reflected
back into space the heat balance of the Earth can also be balanced. This
can be done, for example, by using SRM.
As mentioned above, the objectives of climate change control are
now generally discussed as GHG emissions reduction percentages from
a specified date or C02 or C02 equivalent levels. These are abstract con-
cepts completely outside the experience/knowledge of most people. They
depend on climate sensitivity, which is not knowable in advance 8 ° and not
directly related to the outcomes sought.
Although there are technical difficulties, a better approach would
appear to be to change the focus to major effects rather than difficult ab-
stractions. With sufficient effort these can all probably be accurately deter-
mined, unlike climate sensitivity or even GHG emissions. It appears best
to concentrate on actual objectives related to effects on which there is rela-
tively little room for argument. The effect would be to emphasize them
rather than GHG emissions and C0 2 levels. Examples of these objectives
include global average temperatures, sea level, and ocean pH. This would
focus attention on the critical objectives.
By looking for possible goals associated with these three principal
effects or problems, it may be possible to identify better objectives or goals
for climate change control.
1. Global Average Temperatures
Global temperatures are of critical importance because of their
potential effects on non-linear climate changes (E is), as well as their direct
effects on humans and ecosystems (E2s). If temperatures should be stabi-
lized, the risk of Els will be reduced but not eliminated. At the very least
they would be postponed. Temperature is a useful objective which people
can observe (but with difficulty). One difficulty with its use is that there
is no agreement on how to measure global average temperatures, and
there is significant differences between measurements.' But there is not
likely to be much agreement between countries and peoples as to desired
levels. Some would prefer warmer weather and a few colder.
" See supra Section I.A.1.
.81 See Watts, 4 Sources Say, supra note 18, for a link to recent data from four of the major
indices.
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2. Sea Level Change
Sea level rise may or may not prove to be the most dangerous
aspect of climate change, but it does follow temperatures so stabilization
should prevent temperature rise.8 2 Although there are some difficulties
measuring it and other factors influencing sea level may need to be taken
into account,"8 3 it is an economically important damage from climate
change"s that could provide a very sensitive guide to the optimum level
for incoming radiation from the sun. Importance and degree of progress
would be reinforced every time there is a major storm/event resulting in
coastal flooding. It is very difficult to reverse a rise once it has occurred;
by far the best approach appears to be prevention, so there is a strong
argument for early action to adjust sea level to an advantageous level.
Rising sea levels endanger any infrastructure (such as cities)
humans have built near sea level, as well as access to natural resources
(such as farmland) located at such levels. Substantially decreasing global
temperatures risks a new ice age"' which would endanger any infra-
structure and resources in the path of advancing ice sheets.18 6 Although it
is not possible to accurately define the magnitude or probability of these
two risks, they may well represent the major economic risks associated
with climate change. What remains is a narrow band of temperatures near
those of the current interglacial period; the net economic benefits of con-
trol are likely to be maximized by staying within this narrow band. If the
objective of climate policy is to stay within this band, humans will need
some practical objective for accomplishing this. One possible such physical
objective might be no rise in temperature or sea level (or possibly a little
lowering of temperatures or sea level), but no substantial loss either. This
would keep the world out of a new ice age and also prevent flooding of
land and cities now near sea level.
..
2 Sea level rise is largely due to thermal expansion of oceans and glacial and ice cap melt.
See supra Section I.A.2.e.
" For the difficulties in measuring sea level, see Carl Wunsch et al., Decadal Trends in
Sea Level Patterns: 1993-2004, 20 J. CLIMATE 5889, 5890 (2007). For some of the other
factors that may be influencing it see B.F. Chao et al., Impact ofArtificial Reservoir Water
Impoundment on Global Sea Level, Sci. EXPRESS, Mar. 13, 2008.
" Erica L. Plambeck et al., The Page 95 Model: Integrating the Science and Economics
of Global Warming, 19 ENERGY ECON. 77, 83 (1997).
185 WILLIAM F. RUDDIMAN, PLOWS, PLAGUES, AND PETROLEUM 95-105 (2005).
186 Id.; see also JEAN M. GROVE, THE LITTLE ICE AGE 69-71 (1988) (noting the damage
caused to farmland in Norway by the advance of the Jostedalsbreen ice sheet between
1680 and 1750).
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3. Ocean pH Levels
Important ocean ecosystems involving calcifying organisms, such
as coral reefs, have developed under current ocean pH levels and show con-
siderable sensitivity to these levels." 7 Increasing atmospheric C02 levels
threaten to increase these pH levels (E3), although the exact effects are
uncertain. Ocean pH is measurable and an important objective, but it
would be very difficult to observe or raise public concern about something
they cannot see and are unlikely to understand very well.
In considering whether to abandon ERD as the proposed solution,
an important issue concerns the problem of ocean acidification, the third
of the three principal climate change effects that the world may wish to
address, and which cannot be addressed using SRM. The Royal Society
has expressed considerable concern about the fate of coral reefs and other
sea life containing calcium carbonate in acidifying oceans.' Caldeira has
stated that the reefs and other organisms can really only be saved by
avoiding almost any further CO2 emissions, since he believes any net
emissions will have an adverse effect.'89 He has suggested a ninety-eight
percent reduction from current emission levels, 9 ° apparently assuming
that other natural forces reducing atmospheric C02 levels might counteract
the remaining two percent. The Royal Society and Caldeira cite the high
cost and practical difficulties of geoengineering approaches toward miti-
gating the chemical effects of increased atmospheric C02 concentrations
on the oceans.' 9 ' But as noted, decreasing CO2 emissions will be a difficult
and, at best, a very slow undertaking. 9 2 Reducing them by ninety-eight
percent does not appear to be within the realm of realistic possibility in
the current world, and probably falls well outside the bounds of the achiev-
able if Rive et al. were to analyze this case.'93 But Caldeira argues that not
reducing C02 emissions will result in the extinction of the world's coral
reefs. 94 "Surely before this is allowed to happen it would be worthwhile
187 ROYAL SOCY, supra note 169, at 2.
188 See generally id.
See Ken Caldeira, What Corals Are Dying to Tell Us About CO2 and Ocean Acidification,
20 OCEANOGRAPHY 188, 195 (2007); see also Elizabeth Kolbert, The Darkening Sea, NEW
YORKER, Nov. 20, 2006, at 70.
190 Id. at 195.
191 See generally ROYAL SoC'y, supra note 169, at 37; Caldeira, supra note 189, at 195.
192 See supra Section I.D.
193 See generally Rive et al., supra note 95.
94 Caldeira is quoted as stating, "Coral reefs will go the way of the dodo unless we quickly
cut carbon-dioxide emissions." Press Release, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Regardless of Global Warming, Rising Carbon Dioxide Levels Threaten Marine Life (Mar. 8,
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to carefully reexamine all available [ocean] geoengineering options, includ-
ing those rejected by the Royal Society and Caldeira, since these would
appear to be the only realistic options available that might satisfy [the
Royal Society's and] Caldeira's concerns as to the effects of ocean acidi-
fication."'95 More generally, ocean acidification appears to need additional
research and probably future action once the problem and solutions to it
are better understood.
C. A Practical New Goal
One simple and straightforward approach to bringing Earth's radi-
ation balance into balance would be to aim to adjust incoming radiation'96
so as to prevent any further sea level rise-and perhaps even lowering
it slightly so as to reduce the damage done by storms. This could be the
economic optimum but may not be. Although careful research would be
needed, one possibility might be to control only temperatures in polar
regions while leaving the remainder of the world as it would otherwise be
to the extent possible.'97 There would presumably continue to be thermal
expansion of the oceans in other areas, but that might possibly be bal-
anced by expanding some existing ice sheets. Non-polar glaciers would
continue to shrink, but reversing that would require temperature changes
in non-polar areas as well, which might be much more controversial but
a possible longer term goal.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH-SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT
("SRM")198
Fortunately, there is an alternative to relying on ERD for avoiding
abrupt climate changes (El) and impacts on human populations (E2),
2007), available at http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Newsroom/MediaAlerts/2007/2007
030824507.html.
195 Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1472-75.196 Id. at 1414-15; see also NASA Study, supra note 167.
197 This may be effective because studies show that climate change in polar regions is 1.5
to 4.5 times greater than in the rest of the world. M.M. Holland & C.M. Bitz, Polar
Amplification of Climate Change in Coupled Models, 21 CLIMATE DYNAMIcS 221 (2003).
'
9 8 For a much more detailed discussion of SRM see Carlin, Global Climate Change Control,
supra note 2, at 1446-50 and Alan Carlin, Implementation & Utilization of Geoengineering
for Global Climate Change Control, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POLY 56, 56-58 (2007)
[hereinafter Carlin, Geoengineering Climate Change]. The only SRM option considered
in this Article is that identified as Remedy G in Carlin, Global Climate Change Control,
supra note 2, at 1449-50, 1496-97.
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although it is almost never mentioned by environmentalists and not widely
known, much less understood, by the public: SRM, sometimes called atmo-
spheric geoengineering or engineered climate selection. An extensive review
of management strategies and currently available alternative technolo-
gies for global climate control reached the conclusion that SRM is the most
effective and efficient first step toward solving El and E2 quickly and
easily.199
SRM would control temperatures by reducing the radiation reach-
ing the earth from the sun (or, in the case of global cooling, increasing the
radiation). This could be most easily and reliably accomplished by adding
particles optimized for this purpose to the stratosphere to scatter a small,
carefully calculated portion of selected wavelengths of incoming sunlight
back into space. 2°" These particles would naturally slowly drop out of the
stratosphere, and would have to be replaced, making relatively rapid
adjustments possible. This and similar approaches could be viewed much
like any other aerospace project, would cost a tiny fraction of the cost of
ERD, would need no public involvement once a decision had been made to
proceed, would not require the alteration of lifestyles or standards of living,
would provide the flexibility needed to rapidly respond to any warning
signs of imminent danger, and would allow an appropriate response in
the case of global cooling due to major volcanic eruptions or possible solar
variability-thus solving most of the problems of using ERD, except ocean
acidification. SRM would also avoid the need for extensive economic and
energy planning by leaving GHG emission decisions to the private sector,
possibly using an institution patterned on the Federal Reserve Board or
International Monetary Fund to make periodic adjustments to incoming
solar radiation to achieve the desired global energy balance.
As pointed out by Nobel price winner Paul Crutzen in 200621 and
the National Academy of Sciences in 1992,202 there has already been a
planet-wide proof of concept: when major volcanic eruptions occur, approxi-
mately once a decade, they shoot huge amounts of particles into the air,
cooling the planet for several years. One of the best known examples was
the explosion of Mt. Tambora in 1815, which caused the "year without a
summer" in Europe." 3 The sulfur-containing particles thrown out by
"' Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1464-67.2o Id. at 1448-50; see also id. at 1497-98 (discussing Remedy G).
201 Crutzen, supra note 174, at 212.
20 2 See NATL. ACAD. OF SCI., PANEL ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GREENHOUSE WARMING
448-54 (1992), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309043867.
203 Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1425 (citing Shanaka L. de
Silva, Volcanic Eruptions and Their Impact on the Earth's Climate, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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eruptions are probably less than optimal. °4 It appears reasonable to
believe, however, that humans could substantially improve on nature by
refining the type of particles used and minimizing other possible environ-
mental side effects with a little research and development. Crutzen and
two co-authors have made a step in that direction by recently publishing
an article that explores scenarios involving varying the size of the particles
injected and found that particles smaller than those coming from volcanoes
may be more efficient.2 °5
A. Comparison with Problems Using ERD
One obvious question is how SRM would handle the specific prob-
lems raised in Section I with regard to using ERD. If SRM has the same
problems as ERD, it would not offer much of an alternative. This com-
parison is briefly summarized in Table 1 at the end of this paper.
1. Technically Risky Aspects of ERD
The first problem discussed in Section L.A in relation to the tech-
nical risks of ERD concerns the inability to determine climate sensitivity.
The use of SRM does not require any knowledge of climate sensitivity or
GHG reductions since no reductions would be made. Global warming
would be controlled through reductions in incoming radiation from the
sun, not by changing the GHG levels in the atmosphere and, thereby, (if
successful) the radiation absorbed by the atmosphere. Atmospheric CO 2
levels and emissions would presumably continue to increase.06
The second technical problem with using ERD concerned its in-
ability to prevent further rapid Arctic warming. SRM may be particularly
useful in such an endeavor since it could change the incoming radiation
levels from the sun within a few weeks after a decision was made to use
it. 2°7 SRM may even be able to restrict its effects primarily to the polar
areas if that should be advantageous.
WORLD CLIMATE 788, 788-94 (J. Oliver ed., 2002), available at http://www.space.edul
documents/Volcanoclimate.pdf).
204 NAT'L. AcAD. OF SCI., supra note 202, at 457.
205 Philip J. Rasch et al., Exploring the Geoengineering of Climate Using Stratospheric
Sulfate Aerosols: The Role of Particle Size, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L02809 (2008).
201 Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2 at 1472.
207 Scott Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering, 39 ENVTL. & RESOURCE
ECON. 47 (2008) (citing T. Sterner et al., Natural Disasters and Disastrous Policies, 48
ENVIRONMENT 20 (2006)).
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The third technical problem was the inability of ERD to avoid
abrupt climate changes (E ls). The percentage reduction in incoming sun-
light required to avoid a given increase in global temperatures and the
corresponding addition of particles to the stratosphere to achieve this re-
duction can probably be estimated with moderate accuracy using computer
models."' But in the worst case, the same result could be achieved by trial
and error by starting with very low concentrations and observing the re-
sults and changing the number or reflective capabilities of the next group
of particles added to the stratosphere when that is required by the slow
degradation of the older ones.
The fourth technical problem concerned major adverse environ-
mental and other effects. In this case, the effects would definitely be dif-
ferent, but it is unknown as to whether those resulting from ERD or SRM
would be worse. This is primarily because of lack of research in the case
of SRM.2°9 Because fo the great flexibility in particle placement altitude
and latitude, and in particle quantity, size, and type that can be employed
using SRM, however, it is difficult to make any definitive statements on
environmental impacts until all of these factors have been carefully opti-
mized through research. In the case of ERD, there may have been some
lack of interest in carefully analyzing the environmental effects of decreas-
ing fossil fuel use.210
The fifth and last technical problem concerned the effect of uncer-
tainties on the justification for undertaking large investments in ERD.
Although there is a strong need for development work on SRM, there can
be little doubt as to the technical soundness of the approach given the ex-
perience over many years with temperature changes after major volcanic
eruptions.21' Less incoming sunlight would result in lower temperatures.
There would be a need for a political (preferably international) agreement
on a command and control system for using SRM, but it could, if necessary,
be carried out by one country with the technical and economic resources
to implement it. 212 But once that was accomplished, the system should be
2081 d. at 48.
209 See id. at 48-49 for some possible environmental effects of SRM; see also Eli Kintisch,
Scientists Say Continued Warming Warrants Closer Look at Drastic Fixes, 318 SCIENCE
1054-55 (2007); Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1484-85, 1497.
210 See supra Section I.A.4.
211 Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1424-27; see also Crutzen,
supra note 174, at 212 (noting that there was a decrease in temperature of 0.5°C the year
following the eruption); infra Figure 2.
212 Barrett, supra note 207, at 52-53.
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able to respond rapidly to whatever new knowledge and circumstances
may occur. In the case of a major volcanic eruption, there would be a need
to reduce or eliminate reflecting particles in the stratosphere. If a new ice
age appeared to be coming on for whatever reason, the appropriate re-
sponse would be to substitute particles that would increase temperatures
on Earth. Because of the reduced scale trial and error process and the
regional implementation possible with SRM because of its rapid response
capability and the possibility for selective use at different latitudes, it
would no longer be necessary to fully understand Earth's climate system
in order to make sound judgments as to what to do (although it would be
better to fully understand, of course). Given the uncertainties about the
climate sensitivity factor and the significance of GHGs in explaining cli-
mate change, the same cannot be said for ERD, where the uncertainties
appear likely to undermine any serious attempt to implement it. 213
2. ERD Inflexibility
Because of the need to replenish the particles in the stratosphere
every year or two, SRM would have very great flexibility.214 In fact, SRM
could have as much flexibility as desired by varying the altitude at which
the particles are placed, since particles at lower altitudes drop out of the
atmosphere more rapidly than those placed at higher altitudes. It could,
thus, respond to any change in circumstances or knowledge within a year
and possibly less. It could even respond to possible unwanted global
cooling, if it should ever occur, by placing different particles in the strato-
sphere intended to increase world or regional temperatures.21
3. Extremely Expensive
SRM is estimated to have a marginal cost about 1/10,000th as
expensive as ERD per equivalent ton of carbon reduced to limit global
temperature increases to 2"C above pre-industrial levels using current
assumptions concerning climate sensitivity.21 Less demanding assump-
tions as to climate sensitivity or objectives would presumably result in
lower marginal costs. This comparison is illustrated in Table 1 at the end
of the main text.21 7
213 Supra Section I.A.1.
214 See Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1460.
21 5 Id. at 1449.
21 1 Infra Table 2; Rive et al., supra note 95, at 385.
217 See infra Table 1.
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4. ERD Politically Unrealistic
ERD is politically unrealistic because it places heavy demands on
political systems and has strong economic incentives against it. 218 SRM
does not place burdens on the political system for enforcement and has
lower fixed costs.
219
The first problem with ERD, cited in Section I under this heading,
is that proposed GHG reductions are highly unrealistic. This would not be
a problem under SRM since no reductions would be required.
The second problem concerned whether GHG reductions would be
likely to be successfully implemented. In the case of SRM, there is little
doubt that radiation reductions could be implemented once agreement
was reached to do so since it would require only comparatively modest
financial but some technical resources.
The third problem related to the lack of understanding by the
public of GHG levels or reductions in them. Although SRM would involve
changes in levels of stratospheric particles, the goals and evaluation of
results would presumably be stated in more meaningful terms such as
sea level changes or temperatures, much as the Federal Reserve Board
targets inflation and economic downturns. The fourth problem with ERD
is political. SRM does not require heavy involvement of political resources
and is lower in cost.
B. Other Aspects of the SRM Alternative
SRM would not solve the problem of ocean acidification (E3) in that
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels would not be directly affected. ERD
would help in theory, but given the impossibility of meeting Caldeira's
ninety-eight percent reduction22 ° worldwide to prevent the destruction of
the world's coral reefs, it may not be a useful solution to this problem
either.22' Fortunately, recent research illustrates that nature has worked
out an efficient system for removing carbon dioxide from the seas: fertil-
izing ocean plankton to stimulate them to absorb carbon dioxide (much
as plants do) and transport it to the sea floor. 2 Humans have not yet
21 8Supra Section I.D.
219 Barrett, supra note 207, at 48.
2 Caldeira, supra note 189, at 195.
221 Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1473.
2 22 Id. at 1457-58.
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figured out a very efficient way to emulate nature in this regard-seeding
the ocean with iron particles has been suggested-but ocean fertilization
may be the best current hope, whether under either the ERD or the SRM
approach.223 Given the magnitude of the threat, research on and implemen-
tation of geoengineering or other solutions to ocean acidification also needs
to become a top priority.
Some scientists have suggested a related strategy: using SRM im-
mediately to bring down temperatures during the long period required to
reduce GHG emissions, thus avoiding all the adaptation costs and risks
of using regulatory de-carbonization alone, while helping the oceans a
bit.224 This appears to be much more expensive than an SRM approach
since extensive de-carbonization expenses would be incurred as well, but
it would prevent abrupt climate changes (Els)in the interim, and it is
clearly safer than an ERD approach. Others have advocated using SRM
as an insurance policy to back up de-carbonization. The problem with this
is that very large adaptation and de-carbonization expenses would be in-
curred in the meantime. And the world may be totally unprepared to use
SRM when an emergency arises unless decision-making processes for
using it are actively developed and research is carried out to optimize the
particles and minimize the environmental effects. This is unlikely to hap-
pen unless there are real plans to deploy SRM in the immediate future.
Even though any nation with the technical and financial resources could
implement such a solution on its own, it would be much better to use an
international institution to make decisions on how and when such projects
should be undertaken and maintained, given their global impact.225
Numerous arguments against SRM have been made, such as the
risk of unintended consequences.226 Certainly there is a need for research
to better determine the other environmental effects of SRM. But, although
great care needs to be taken in pursuing SRM so as to avoid adverse un-
intended consequences, it is not often recognized that ERD is also likely
to engender unintended consequences, as it already has.227 There exists
an extensive inventory of other arguments for and against various forms
223/Id.
224 See Wigley, supra note 174, at 452-54.
225 Carlin, Geoengineering Climate Change, supra note 198.
226 See generally Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project,
17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 73 (1998) (detailing SRM's pros and cons); see also Carlin, Global
Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1480-85.
227 See supra Section I.A.4.
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of geoengineering such as SRM, but the issue really turns on a meta-
physical question. Even though most GHG control supporters believe
that humans are causing major climate changes, they would rather let
nature translate human actions in increasing or decreasing GHG emis-
sions into the ultimate effects on climate.228
Advocates of SRM and other atmospheric geoengineering ap-
proaches, on the other hand, argue that it would be better for humans
to determine the desired climatic outcomes (such as lower average tem-
peratures) directly and relatively precisely rather than letting nature,
which has no incentive to help humans, sort out the net effects of GHG
producing activities. In other words, SRM advocates argue that it is
simpler, more direct, and more efficient to attempt to directly determine
desired world or regional temperatures rather than trying to guess what
GHG reductions might yield the desired temperatures some time in the
future, and then trying to implement the reductions. 9 The aim is the
same-controlling world temperatures. SRM would do it directly. In the
optimistic case an ERD program would first make some educated guesses
as to the GHG reductions needed, then try to implement these reductions
over a period of many years, then likely revise the estimated reductions
needed and try again until it finally got it "right." During this entire time,
which could extend over many decades, the world risks abrupt climate
changes (Els) if the first try should fail either because of a bad guess as to
the reductions needed or because the implementation of these reductions
proved ineffective. More research could refine SRM solutions, but ERD
supporters generally oppose it,2" ° so there is currently no way to find out
what the most optimized solutions might be as to where to place exactly
what types of particles in the stratosphere.
Humans have advanced as much as they have in no small part
because they have used fossil fuel energy to provide services that once
depended on animal and muscle power. The way forward is not to turn
back the clock but rather to search for and implement solutions to each
of the problems posed by global climate change using the best engineer-
ing and scientific knowledge in the most effective and efficient manner.
Unfortunately, the major effect of relying entirely on the hope of dras-
tically reducing carbon emissions may well be to delay the time when
effective action is taken to actually solve the three problems posed by
22 See Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1480-81.
229 See Michaelson, supra note 226, at 122-30.
20 Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1480-85.
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global warming. Developing, testing, and deploying refined versions of
SRM and determining its environmental effects needs to be a priority,
even if it should never be used because possible changes in global tem-
peratures no longer pose any major risks.
Any approach to climate change control needs to be able to handle
all credible threats. It needs to be flexible, and to rapidly adapt to new
knowledge or circumstances. It needs to be inexpensive enough to mini-
mize damage to the economy but effective enough to protect us. Building,
testing, and deploying a workable SRM capability is the best investment
we can currently make to control climate change. Unfortunately, we are
not taking this modest step, and probably will not, as long as we remain
fixated on solutions that demand extensive changes of the world's energy
economy.
An alternative to ERD is to increase the negative forcing created by
stratospheric aerosols (shown as the jagged line at the bottom of Figure
1(a)).23 There would appear to really be only three basic options and
several combinations thereof available for dealing with global climate
change: Adaptation, ERD, and SRM/atmospheric geoengineering. My
analysis of the Hansen et al. case232 suggests, however, that ERD is not
a useful option for preventing abrupt climate changes (Els), although it
can still be helpful. Even if Hansen et al.'s threat analysis of ice sheet
disintegration, where global temperatures rise 2"C above pre-industrial
limits, is wrong, case 3.b suggests that ERD is still unlikely to be success-
ful in meeting a 2"C temperature limit given average assumptions.233
This raises the interesting question of which threat/goal (3.a or
3.b) any control effort should aim to satisfy? Given the nature of the
threat, I believe the answer should be the most serious credible threat.
In this case 3.a is more serious and credible for the following reason:
Suppose ice sheet disintegration (3.a) turns out to be the real threat. If
we only do enough to keep global temperatures from rising more than
2"C (3.b), we will have a situation where the world will have spent many
trillions of dollars and much valuable time (in the case of ERD) and
failed to accomplish the goal of avoiding the real threat. As a result, the
world will also have to bear the resulting adaptation costs, such as moving
many major cities inland. On the other hand, if we do enough to prevent
ice sheet disintegration (3.a), we are also likely to avoid the threats by
"' See infra Figure 1.
232 Supra Section I.A.3.a.
233 See supra Section I.A.3.b.
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preventing global temperature rises (3.b). And if 3.b costs almost as much
as 3.a, as is the case with using SRM, the logic is hard to escape. In hind-
sight we may have spent more than we needed to, but we would have
solved the problem and avoided the worst of the catastrophic adaptation
costs. Missing the real threat/goal level by even a little may slow the
onset of a dangerous climate change, but will not prevent it. This is the
nature of the non-linear dangerous climate change threats we face. ERD
is particularly ill-suited for avoiding such threats since there will always
be political pressure to save a little money, do a little less or even cheat
a little in reducing GHG emissions, assuming that worldwide agreement
should ever be reached and implemented.
Climate change control needs to have other goals as well, but
avoiding abrupt climate changes (E ls) is surely the most immediate and
critical one. As previously concluded, SRM appears to be the best single
option taking all the goals into account.2 34 If ERD cannot offer a high
degree of assurance of accomplishing the fundamental goal of avoiding a
substantial risk of dangerous climatic change, that would appear to leave
various other combinations of ERD, adaptation, and SRM as the only
remaining options for this purpose.
Although nature long ago demonstrated that there are atmospheric
geoengineering options that could be effective in controlling global tem-
peratures235 and meeting a 1.8*C limit or any other desired temperature
limit, no real effort has been made to optimize these options, carefully de-
termine their other environmental effects, nor build an international mech-
anism for decision making to implement them2 36 despite the much lower
costs (three to five orders of magnitude) compared to de-carbonization.237
One country with the required technological and financial resources could,
if necessary, implement such a solution directly without involving other
countries or people once a decision had been made to proceed.238 One possi-
bility is a combination of early SRM to avoid any danger of abrupt climate
changes (Els) with cost-effective regulatory decarbonization involving
increasing energy efficiency but not decreasing energy services. Lack of
preparation and support for using SRM approaches may prove to be un-
fortunate because the result is likely to be expensive but ineffective ERD
Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1486-87.
2 5 Id. at 1449; Crutzen, supra note 174, at 212.
236 See generally Carlin, Geoengineering Climate Change, supra note 198.
131 See infra Table 2.
238 Carlin, Geoengineering Climate Change, supra note 198, at 57; Carlin, Global Climate
Change Control, supra note 2, at 1413-14.
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and the threat of catastrophic adaptation. And if Hansen et al. and
Caldeira are correct, the resulting adaptation currently appears likely
to include adaptation to "dangerous" climate changes and the loss of the
world's coral reefs.239
The first step towards an effective and efficient response to global
climate change is to carefully examine each of the problems posed by
global climate change and to determine the best solutions to each prob-
lem 240 rather than offering a single panacea (ERD) that appears to have
critical limitations as an overall solution. The second step is to carry out the
needed development and also to develop a decision-making process for
better using SRM. And, the third step is to carefully research and attempt
to find workable solutions to ocean acidification, including consideration
of the use of ocean geoengineering. Continuing down a path towards ERD,
if Hansen et al. are correct, will apparently not avoid dangerous climate
changes, or if they are not, would still be very risky, very expensive, and
quite possibly disastrous in the end.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, ERD might be useful for solving the problem of ocean
acidification (E3) if that is possible given the extremely stringent require-
ments believed to be needed to save the coral reefs and other calcifying
marine life. It would probably do no harm in solving abrupt climate change
(El) and gradual temperature change (E2) problems as long as the prob-
lem is GW and not global cooling, but would be unlikely to be of much help
either. For global cooling, either as a result of probable large volcanic
eruptions or possible solar variability, it would have negative value since
it would presumably only make the cooling worse. In order to be useful
for GW, it would be necessary to guess decades in advance how much of
a GHG emissions reduction would be necessary to precisely meet par-
ticular GW reduction targets, despite the daunting problems of success-
fully implementing voluntary international agreements that are contrary
to the short-term self-interest of the nations involved. This would be more
a matter of dumb luck than careful planning given the many uncertainties
involved. So ERD's main use for these two purposes would appear to be
using it when it can be justified for other purposes, such as improving
profitability through improving energy efficiency or improving national
" See Caldeira, supra note 189, at 194.24 See generally Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2.
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security. Depending on ERD for controlling El and E2 would be very
expensive and risky and would probably delay more effective and vastly
less expensive measures using SRM.
So what to do? The highest priority seems to be to immediately
develop an SRM capability to handle any immediate temperature-related
effects, possibly first for use in polar areas, when and if they should appear
dangerous or advantageously handled by SRM. The needed development
work includes optimization of particle quantity, size and type, particle
placement by altitude and latitude, determination of other environmental
effects, building a command and control capability, and making the legal
changes needed to insure that the entity involved could not be sued for
damages resulting from climate changes. There also appears to be a need
to greatly increase research on indicators of GIS and WAIS disintegration
and on causes of and solutions to the problem of ocean acidification. In addi-
tion, it would appear reasonable to carry out those components of regulatory
de-carbonization that can be justified on other grounds, such as national
security or profitability. Other aspects of regulatory de-carbonization might
reasonably be postponed until we can be assured that they would have
a reasonable probability of achieving effective and efficient global climate
change control. There is little doubt that SRM can be used to regulate
global, and possibly even some more regional, temperatures whether or not
global warming is caused primarily by GHGs or by a solar variability, or
both. Regardless of whether temperatures may increase or decrease in the
future, this would appear to be a very useful technology to have available
for human use, particularly if there should be any threat of a new ice age.
More generally, the world appears to be faced not only with the
possibility of catastrophic losses but also with great uncertainty. Wisdom
would seem to be to build a highly flexible global climate change control
approach that can handle all of the major risks inexpensively and with a
high probability of success. The global warming problem currently appears
to be worse than the IPCC reports reflect in terms of Arctic warming. ERD
appears highly unlikely to provide a practical solution to the possibility
of dangerous climate changes and certainly not an economically efficient
one. SRM or SRM with regulatory de-carbonization justifiable on other
grounds appears to be the best and probably the only real alternative.
SRM requires some development, funding, and a legal change, none of
which has started. Both ERD and SRM need to be implemented with
great caution given the unknowns and the unintended adverse effects
that could result. Such unintended effects are much more likely if SRM
is delayed until a possible emergency when the emphasis will be on speed
[Vol. 32:685746
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rather than unintended effects. Halting sea level rise would be a more use-
ful objective than trying to reduce GHG emissions by a specified amount,
in part, because we do not know what reductions might be required and
appear unlikely to find out until it is too late to use ERD. Sea level rise
also appears to be a more useful and understandable objective. Research
is needed, however, on the relationships between this and other possible
goals. SRM will not solve the ocean acidification problem, which needs
additional research and probably future action once the problem and the
solutions to it are better understood.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
• 0
,U,,
'a) Radiative Forcings
' I I I I I I I I
-Well-Mixed Greenhouse Gases
-Ozone
-Stratospheric H20
tSolar r diance
------ Land Use
---- Snow Albedo (BC effect)
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Figure 1(a): Effective global climate forcings over time since 1880.241
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"' Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Datasets & Images, http://data.giss.nasa.gov/
modelforce/ (last visited Apr. 4,2008). The color version of this figure on that website may
be easier to understand than the black and white version reproduced here.
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Global Climate Forcings
Temperature Change
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Figure 2: Relation of stratospheric aerosol forcings to global temperature
changes.243
2
' Chart is a modified form of one used by Jim Hansen. See Jim Hansen, Global Warming.
Is There Still Time to Avoid Disastrous Human-Made Climate Change? i.e. Have We
Passed a Tipping Point,' Presentation at the National Academy of Sciences (Apr. 23, 2006)
(Presentation available at http://www.columbia.edu/-jehl/nas-24apri12006.pdf). The
modifications are intended to make the temperature data more legible and the timing of
major volcanic eruptions clearer. The eruptions that have not been identified are the
following: 1902: Santa Maria, Soufriere, and Pelee; 1963: Agung; and 1982: El Chichon.
The temperature data are the surface temperature observations shown by Hansen in his
original figure.
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Table 1: General Comparison of SRM and ERD Approaches'
Control approach SRM ERD
Time to modify Months to year or 2 Decades
Ability to handle Very great Very limited by need for new
uncertainties international negotiations
Dangerous changes Capable of 50% probability at best of
(Els) fully avoiding achieving less than 2"C
increase 245
Ocean acidification No effect Reduce w/difficulty, not
(E3) solve246
Marginal cost/ton $0.02 to 0.10 $3,500 to achieve 2"C w/50%
carbon probability 47
Overall costs Development total $10' R&D >>$5 x $10' per year2418
Annual $109 Control >>$135 x $109 per
year
249
Effectiveness Very high Probably very low
Other environmental Unknown and untested Some already evident like
effects but likely rainforest destruction from
oil palm expansion
Participation needed Government Active by most governments,
involvement desirable companies, and people
initially; not required
24Based on Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, unless otherwise stated.
245 Rive et al., supra note 95 tbl. 1. This assumes a goal of staying below a 2"C temperature
increase from pre-industrial levels in order to avoid dangerous climate changes as per
European Union policy.
246 See discussion supra Section II.B.3.
247 Rive et al., supra note 95, at 385.
24 According to Table 8 of the FIscAL YEAR 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FEDERAL
CLIMATE CHANGE EXPENDITURES (2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
legislative/fy07-climate change.pdf, U.S. Government Climate Change Science and
Technology Programs alone were about $4.5 billion in recent years. This excludes all
privately funded US R&D and all foreign R&D. Some was for R&D on effects rather than
control. $5 billion appears to be a safe lower limit worldwide for control portion of
expenditures.
249 See SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF LORDS, H.L. 12-I, THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: VOLUME I, 2005-6, at 44, Table 6, available at http:l
www.scribd.com/doc/l22554stern-report-the-economics-of-climate-change. Table 6 assumes
a 550 ppm target for CO2, 3% discount rate, and 20 years at 2005 prices. Id. 550 ppm
would not come anywhere near keeping temperatures below 2"C according to current
projections and 3% is unreasonably low. So this is likely to be very much of a lower bound
using projections used at the time of this Lords' report. Id.
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Appendix 1: Analysis of Two Cases to Determine the Feasibility
of Using ERD to Control Dangerous Global Climate Changes
Analysis of Major Parameters
The Rive et al. paper250 uses a number of factors or parameters
(which I have labeled P1, P2, P3, and P5) in determining the feasibility
of emissions reductions to meet several alternative temperature limits.
In addition there is a need to enhance their analysis by adding an addi-
tional parameter (P4) in order to make the analysis correspond better to
the real world, where the final outcome of ERD implementation can never
be fully known in advance. Instead, it must be based on expectations of
future implementation of proposed mitigation measures. It should be
noted that this added parameter by itself does not change the conclusions
in the two cases examined, although it certainly reinforces them. In order
to escape the above conclusions concerning the limited usefulness of ERD
in each case, one presumably must believe that ERD meets tests concerning
all of the following parameters (see Table 2 below and the sources for it):
(P1) Climate sensitivity to increased CO2. To meet the test of
this parameter in Case 3.a it would be necessary to assume that
sensitivity is less than about 3.1C assuming a 2*C limit. In other
words, reliance on ERD approaches depends critically on the
assumed C0 2 sensitivity. Even if one believes that Hansen et al.'s
60C is too pessimistic, one must believe that the sensitivity is no
more than about 3.1 C in order to fall within Rive et al's possibili-
ties curve. Hansen et al. clearly believe that the IPCC failed to
take into account very significant factors that the IPCC may not
have known about at the time since the Hansen et al. paper was
not published until almost a year after the IPCC deadline. Just
because the majority of the IPCC reviewers held a different view
at that time does not make Hansen et al. incorrect, however. In
Case 3.b Rive et al.'s analysis assumes that P1 is about 3"C, so
Case 3.b meets this test.2
51
(P2) Maximum global temperature increase that avoids a substan-
tial risk that there will be a dangerous climate change if global
temperatures increase more than that amount. The higher the
maximum, the easier it is to meet it. In Case 3.a, it would be nec-
25See generally Rive et al., supra note 95.
251 See generally Rive et al., supra note 95.
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essary to believe that ERD could reduce the increase to no more
than a further 1°C (1.8"C above pre-industrial levels) to avoid the
large increase in sea level predicted by Hansen et al. (2). This is
actually significantly more stringent than the requirement of less
than 2°C in case 3.b. But since Rive et al did not consider 1.8°C,
it will be (charitably) assumed here that meeting the 2°C limit,
which they do show, is the equivalent of meeting 1.8. With this
assumption, ERD satisfies this test for both cases.
(P3) Relation of case to error bounds defined by Rive et al. It is
assumed here that Rive et al.'s analysis is as valid as is currently
possible. Under Case 3.a, in order for the conclusion not to hold,
it would be necessary to believe that the results of using a 1.8°C
limit with Hansen et al.'s doubled temperature sensitivity to CO2
falls on or inside the implementation possibilities curve for this
temperature limit, which it comes nowhere close to doing.252 In
case 3.b, the average probability estimates do fall on the imple-
mentation possibilities curve for a 2°C limit and early "action," so
it does qualify. 3
(P4) The ratio of actual emissions reductions that would be achieved
in the real world application of ERD to the optimized reductions
assumed by the modeling studies that Rive et al. used to derive their
results. This is not part of Rive et al.'s analysis but has been added
to make the analysis more realistic since this is likely to be a major
problem with actually implementing ERD in the manner that may
be agreed to.254 Rive et al. effectively assume that the ERD efforts
are as successful in reducing the risk of global warming as the
underlying studies they use assume they are, with the exception
that they differentiate between "early" and "late" action.255 Since
these studies effectively assume 100 percent success (a ratio of 1),
Rive et al. do as well. There is ample reason to believe, however,
that the real world implementation of whatever measures may
actually be decided on to implement ERD will fall well short of the
252 Id. at 382 (relying on Figure 6).
253 Id.
24 See supra Section I.D.2.
255 Rive et al., supra note 95, at 378-79.
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ideal cases assumed by the underlying studies for a number of prac-
tical reasons, 56 taking into account that the Rive et al. analysis
will really only be useful before a decision is made as to how to
implement climate change control. If, for example, implementation
should be carried out through an extension of the Kyoto Protocol,
P4 would be the ratio of actual reductions achieved worldwide to
the reductions agreed to in the extension worldwide. Although the
period of performance of the current Protocol is not yet over, it is
already clear that the ratio will be much less than 1.0 when it is
completed.1 7 The reasons advanced in Section I.D., above, are just
a few of the factors that make it hard to believe that P4 would be
very large. And there is every reason to believe that it would be
quite small. But assuming that experience to date in jurisdictions
with relatively advanced energy efficiency programs, such as
California and Great Britain, is relevant for determining P4, P4
would currently be roughly 0 since no real decrease in emissions
has occurred. Now it is possible that more might be accomplished
by a more aggressive ERD effort, such as is now proposed by some,
but that is far from clear. It would be particularly necessary to be-
lieve that the ratio is very high to change the conclusion in Case 3.b,
because it would have to be in order to achieve even the probabili-
ties shown by Rive et al.'s analysis. So it is extremely unlikely
that this parameter could be used to change the conclusions with
regard to the usefulness of ERD in this Case.
(P5) The cumulative probability as defined by Rive et al. This is
the probability that a given temperature limit will be achieved
given the variability in the underlying studies used. An important
issue is what the minimum probability society would find accept-
able if it were to undertake a serious effort at climate change
control and below which it would not want to pursue a particular
control approach given the sacrifices involved. In case 3.a, the
actual probability shown by Rive et al.'s analysis is 0, which is
clearly unacceptable. But in Case 3.b this probability is more
crucial since Rive et al. shows that under ideal circumstances
there is a 50 percent probability of achieving a 2°C limit.258 Given
256 See supra Section I.D.2.
257 Carlin, Global Climate Change Control, supra note 2, at 1431.
25 Rive et al., supra note 95, at 382 (relying on Figure 6).
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the gravity of the possible consequences and the sacrifices involved,
I believe that 50 percent is much less than citizens would be will-
ing to accept if carefully polled, but this is a matter of judgment.
90 percent would appear more reasonable, but no "acceptable"
number above 50 percent leads to an unchanged conclusion.
The conclusions from this analysis are that ERD fails in Case 3.a because
four of five parameters fail. In Case 3.b, ERD fails unless a probability
of 50 percent is acceptable (in P5) and the achievement ratio (P4) is much
higher than it is likely to be. Even so, it would be extremely expensive
according to Rive et al.259
259 See id. at 385 (relying on Table 1).
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Table 2: Analysis of Major Parameters to Determine Feasibility
of Using ERD to Control Dangerous Global Climate Changes
Parameters (P1) Temp. (P2) (P3) Relation (P4) Real (P5)
sensitivity Temp. to Rive sensi- world Probability
('C) limit tivity bounds achieve- of
('C) ment ratio achievement
of limit (%)
Case 3.a-Hansen et al. correct on risk of Greenland/West Antarctic ice sheet
disintegration if P2>1.8"C
A.1. Actual/ 6 1.8 Well outside Very low 0
assumed high estimate
A.2. To <3.1 1.8 Meets average Very high >90
accept ERD projection
A.3. To >3.1 >1.8 Outside high Medium to <90
reject ERD estimate low
A.4. Con- Fails Meets Not Fails Fails
clusions using achievable
concerning 2°C
ERD I
Case 3.b-EU correct that lobal tem erature rise should be no more than 2"C
B.1. Actual/ 3 2 Meets average Very low 50
assumed projection
B.2. To <3.1 <2.0 Meets average Very high 90
accept ERD projection
B.3. To >3.1 >2.0 Outside high Medium to <90
Reject ERD estimate low
B4. Con- Meets Meets Meets Fails Meets if 50%
clusions acceptable;
concerning fails if
ERD acceptable
__________________________ ___________P5>51
Sources for Table 2:
Column P1: Row A.1: Rive et al., supra note 95; Rows A.2, A.3,
B.2, and B.3: Based on visual reading of Table 6 of Rive et al., supra note
95, at 382; Row A.4: Comparison of Row A.3 with A.1; Row B.1: Approxi-
mation of IPCC estimate shown in the explanation for Figure 2 of Rive
et al., supra note 95; Row B.4: Comparison of Rows B.2 and B.1.
Column P2: Rows A.1, A.2, and A.3: Hansen et al., supra note 69,
1°C increase over current plus approximation of 0.8°C current over
pre-industrial temperatures since this is an optimistic assumption; Row
A.4: Comparison of Rows A.3 with A.1. Rive et al., supra note 95,
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analyzes 2°C, but not 1.8*C, so it is assumed (optimistically) that the two
are the same for the purposes of this cell; Row B.1: See main text for
explanation of selection of 2.0°C; Rows B.2 and B.3: EU policy, supra
note 74 ; Row B.4: Comparison of Row B.2 with B.1.
Column P3: Rows A.1, A.2, A.3, B.1, B.2, and B.3: Based on Rive
et al., supra note 95, Figure 6 using black sensitivity probability lines,
2°C limit, and 2025 peak; Row A.4: Comparison of Row A.3 with A.1; Row
B.1: Also based on ACIA supra note 110; Row B.4: Comparison of Rows
B.2 and B.1.
Column P4: Rows A.1, A.2, A.3, B.1, B.2, and B.3:See discussion
concerning column P4 in main text of this paper; Row A.4: Comparison
of Row A.3 with A.1; Row B.4: Comparison of Rows B.3 and B.1.
Column P5: Row A.1: Table 1 of Rive et al., supra note 95. 1.8
GtCeq is about 80% of year 2000 emissions shown as 9.1 GtCeq in the
footnote to Table 1. In this and all their other cases, Rive et al., supra
note 95, assume that there will be no overshooting because they believe
that overshooting might compromise the overall objective. Their term
'overshoot' refers to when a scenario exceeds a given target (i.e., tem-
perature) for a short period of time as a result of climate system inertia,
before eventually returning to the target level. Rows A.2, A.3, B.2, and
B.3: Estimate as described in text. Row A.4: Comparison of Row A.3 and
A.1; Row B.1: ACIA, supra note 110. Row B.4: Comparison of Row B.3
and B.1. This conclusion holds as long as B.3 is greater than in Row B.1,
regardless of the 90 % estimate used for B.3.
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